Baby Doe Decisions: Modern Society\u27s Sins of Omission by Winner, Anne Elizabeth
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 63 | Issue 4 Article 12
1984
Baby Doe Decisions: Modern Society's Sins of
Omission
Anne Elizabeth Winner
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Anne Elizabeth Winner, Baby Doe Decisions: Modern Society's Sins of Omission, 63 Neb. L. Rev. (1984)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol63/iss4/12
Comment
Baby Doe Decisions: Modern
Society's Sins of Omission
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .............................................. 889
II. The Law As It Is .......................................... 893
A. Child Neglect ......................................... 895
1. Generally ......................................... 895
2. Exceptions to the Parental Duty ................. 898
a. Impossibility and Substantial Risk: the Es-
tablished Exceptions .......................... 898
b. Quality of Life Prognosis: An Emerging
Exception ...................................... 901
c. The Next Exception ........................... 906
3. Problems with Neglect Law ...................... 909
a. Interpretation ................................. 909
b. Enforcement .................................. 912
B. Handicapped Discrimination ........................ 915
1. The Attempt at Formal Federal Regulation ..... 917
a. Section 504 .................................... 917
b. The 1984 "Baby Doe Regulations" ............ 918
2. Local Analysis .................................... 921
C. Law on the Periphery ................................ 922
1. Killing and Planning to Kill: Homicide and
Conspiracy ........................................ 922
2. The Child's Best Interests: Borrowing the Cus-
tody Standard ..................................... 924
3. Protecting the Nearly-Born: Postviability Abor-
tion Regulation ................................... 926
III. Directions the Law May Seek ............................ 929
A. Chinks in the Doctor-Parent Armor ................. 929
B. Alternatives to Doctor-Parent Exclusivity .......... 931
1. Ethics Committees ............................... 932
2. Legislative Proposals ............................. 933
C. The Role of the Court ................................ 935
IV. Conclusion ................................................ 939
BABY DOE DECISIONS
The quality of a culture is measured by its reverence for all life.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Curing mankind of its physical ills is medicine's noble pursuit.
The advances in the field over the last generation have been stag-
gering, and the benefits to society immeasurable. However, an un-
fortunate side-effect of the advance is our ability to forestall death,
without being able to alleviate all sickness that in years past would
have precipitated death. We can hold death at bay; we can keep
life, sometimes. But we cannot assure that those who are saved
will live healthy lives.
The painful consequence of this getting ahead of ourselves is
nowhere more poignantly illustrated than in the case of a baby
born with birth defects. If the child suffers from incurable defects,
but can be kept alive, the inquiry may become whether the child
should be kept alive, and under what circumstances. Medical and
legal professionals labor with the inquiry, and certainly no answer
is completely satisfactory-the issue is such a troubling one. But
the answers the courts have risked in their judicial decisions are,
at best, clumsy and inconsistent.
The public's attention was recently captured by a decision
which sparked such a new and furious debate on the rights of fami-
lies, the duty of physicians, the role of the courts, and the responsi-
bility of governments, that it rages even now. The child called
"Baby Doe" has lent his name to all babies whose lives are simi-
larly at stake.
It began quietly enough. On April 9, 1982, "Infant Doe"2 was
born, the third child to his parents, in Bloomington Hospital, Indi-
ana. Baby Doe suffered from two different birth defects: he was
afflicted with Down's Syndrome,3 a condition from which he would
1. Atttributed to Albert Schweitzer. While perhaps apocryphal, the statement
expresses eloquently the animus that pervades both Schweitzer's life and
this Article.
2. The child is known as "Infant Doe," born to "John and Mary Doe." Records of
the subsequent proceedings are sealed in accordance with Indiana law, al-
though limited facts and findings are available. The child's mother was 31
years old at the time of birth, and according to the parents' attorney, she had
apparently been thought too young to undergo amniocentesis during her
pregnancy. See generally Longino, Withholding Treatment from Defective
Newborns: Who Decides, and on What Criteria?, 31 KAN. L REV. 377, 382
(1983); Letter from Dr. John Pless of Bloomington Hosp., 309 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 554 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Pless Letter]. Presumably, pre-natal
detection of Baby Doe's defects would have enabled his parents to consider
abortion.
3. Once commonly referred to as "mongolism," Down's Syndrome is mental re-
tardation, the severity of which is impossible to estimate at birth, and the
precise extent of which cannot be determined in early infancy. See Bannon,
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never recover, and from tracheoesophageal fistula, a surgically cor-
rectable condition. 4 This defect of the esophagus hampered
breathing and prohibited swallowing, as the passage from the
mouth to the stomach had not properly developed. Any oral feed-
ing would probably have suffocated the child. Two pediatricians
(one of which was the Doe family pediatrician) advised immediate
transfer to another hospital for surgery to correct the esophageal
defect. A third doctor (the attending obstetrician) recommended
that Baby Doe remain at Bloomington Hospital, forego any correc-
tive surgery to effectuate oral feeding, and receive only that treat-
ment that would keep him relatively comfortable and free of pain
until he inevitably died of either pneumonia or starvation. 5
John and Mary Doe chose "nontreatment."6 The next day, hos-
The Case of the Bloomington Baby, 8 HuM. LIFE REV. 63, 63 (1982); Zellweger &
Ionasescu, Genetics of Mental Retardation, in MEDICAL ASPECTS OF MENTAL
RETARDATION 160 (2d ed. 1978). Down's Syndrome occurs in approximately
one in every 700 live births. Often, other congenital defects, especially heart
problems, are also present. See W. NYHAN & N. SAKATh GENETIC AND MALFOR-
MATION SYNDROMES IN CLINICAL MEDICINE 1, 21 (1976). See also infra note 4
and accompanying text.
4. According to a recent report by a Presidential Commission to study withhold-
ing medical treatment, the two most common defects present in a Down's
Syndrome infant are congenital heart problems and gastrointestinal block-
age, which includes Baby Doe's affliction of tracheoesophageal fistula. Left
untreated, a child similarly afflicted will die of pneumonia or starvation.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-Sus-
TAINING TREATMENT 203 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
REP.]. Surgery on such gastrointestinal defects is typically successful. Id.
Conflicting opinions on Baby Doe's chances for surviving the operation
ranged from "probably successful," to a 50-50 chance for success, to minimal
chance of surviving the operation. See In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A
(Ind. Cir. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 10, 1982) (Declaratory Judgment); Bannon,
supra note 3, at 63; Longino, supra note 2, at 382 n.30. In fact, Baby Doe's
condition was surgically "reparable"--at least on day one of his life. See
Pless Letter, supra note 2, at 664.
5. The Monroe County Circuit Court Judge described Baby Doe's fate euphe-
mistically: to 'succomb [sic] due to inability to receive nutriment ..... " In re
Infant Doe No. GU8204-004A (Ind. Cir. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 10, 1982).
6. Withholding treatment from defective newborns, at least to the extent that
heroic steps are not taken in cases where the prognoses are bad, is known as
"passive" or "involuntary" euthanasia, or sometimes "dysthanasia." These
terms attempt to distinguish between cases where treatment is withheld
under certain circumstances, from cases where an affirmative act of "mercy-
killing" (what may traditionally be considered "euthanasia") takes place
under similar circumstances. In the first instance, treatment is never admin-
istered; in the second instance, present treatment is withdrawn or removed,
in an affirmative act of "pulling the plug." See Robertson, Involuntary Eutha-
nasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 214 n.16
(1975). Cf. Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the
Quinlan Case, 30 RUTG. L. REV. 304, 309 & nn.21-23 (1977).
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pital representatives requested a court hearing to determine the
extent to which the hospital would be liable if Baby Doe "suc-
cumbed" pursuant to the parents' wishes. The Circuit Court for
Monroe County, Indiana, concluded that "after having been fully
informed of the opinions of two sets of physicians," the parents
had the right to choose a "medically recommended course of treat-
ment" for Baby Doe.7
The court directed the hospital to allow the "treatment" pre-
scribed by the obstetrician and chosen by the parents.8 The
county prosecutor learned of the decision, and filed an emergency
petition with the juvenile court seeking to remove Baby Doe from
his parents' custody, and to authorize lifesaving treatment.9 The
court denied the petition,'0 finding that "the State has failed to
show that this child's physical or mental condition is seriously im-
paired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal,
or neglect of his parents to supply the child with necessary food,
and medical care."l1 The Supreme Court of Indiana refused to re-
verse.12 Baby Doe was baptized and given last rites, but he was
not given lifesaving surgery, and he was not fed intravenously. He
died April 15, 1982, at six days, as lawyers prepared an appeal to
the United States Supreme Court.
7. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Ind. Cir. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 10, 1982).
The court noted that "Mr. Doe was lucid and able to make an intelligent, in-
formed decision." See infra notes 27, 196 & 224 and accompanying text (pa-
rental autonomy and parents' desire not to be shielded from painful
decisionmaking).
8. The Monroe County Child Protection Team, and the appointed guardian
Monroe County Department of Public Welfare, apparently conducted a hear-
ing and decided not to appeal the decision. In re Baby Doe, No. JV8204-038A
(Ind. Juv. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 13, 1982) (Finding 11).
9. Id IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-4 (Burns 1979) authorizes removal of a child from
parental custody. Some local couples sought to adopt Baby Doe, one of
whom had a three-year old daughter with Down's Syndrome. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 17, 1982, at A6, col. 2.
10. The court stated that: "[I] n order for the Court to issue such an order it must
be shown that the child is a child in need of services pursuant to I.C. 31-6-4-3."
In re Baby Doe, No. JV8204-038A (Ind. Juv. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 13, 1982)
(Finding 13).
11. Id. A Petition for Temporary Restraining Order was also denied. The lan-
guage of Finding 14 is from IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3 (Burns Cum. Supp.
1982).
12. Indiana ex rel Infant Doe v. Monroe Cir. Ct., No. 482 5140 (Ind. Apr. 16, 1982),
cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 104 S. Ct. 394 (1983). See
Longino, supra note 2, at 382 n.30. Upholding the rulings of the Circuit Court
and Juvenile Court judges, the Indiana Supreme Court, on April 14, 1982,
ruled that Baby Doe's parents could withhold treatment. See N.Y. Times,
Apr. 15, 1982, at D21, col. 5. Baby Doe died hours before a stay of the Indiana
Supreme Court ruling was to be heard by Justice Stevens of the United
States Supreme Court.
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The public response to the Indiana decision was generally unfa-
vorable. Right-to-life groups,' 3 those concerned with human rights
in general,14 and those involved with rights of the handicapped in
particular,15 expressed strong disapproval. President Reagan,
through the Department of Health and Human Services, empha-
sized his intent to enforce existing laws,16 and promulgated a new
rule for federally funded hospitals that attempted to make actions
of this sort prohibited acts of discrimination against the handi-
capped.17 The new rule was short-lived, however,18 and the ade-
quacy of existing laws and the fate of current regulations are in
serious doubt.19
The Baby Doe judges wrestled with a narrow issue: the right of
13. See Wallis, The Stormy Legacy of Baby Doe, TIME, Sept. 26, 1983, at 58.
14. See generally Bannon, supra note 3.
15. See supra note 9; infra notes 137-76 and accompanying text.
16. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination solely
on the basis of handicap by federally assisted programs and institutions. 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Di-
rector Richard Schweiker warned federally funded hospitals that section 504
would apply in cases involving the medical care of infants with birth defects,
and that violations might warrant termination of federal assistance. 47 Fed.
Reg. 26,027 (June 16, 1982). See Russell & Babcock, "Hospitals Warned on
Handicapped Babies," The Wash. Post, May 19, 1982 at A21, col. 4. This was
apparently the first time section 504 had been applied to the medical treat-
ment of handicapped infants. Id at A21, col. 5.
17. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.51-.52. The new rule required federally assisted medical insti-
tutions to post a sign in all pre- and post-partum wards, nurseries, delivery
rooms and pediatrics wards warning that "Discriminatory Failure to Feed
and Care for Handicapped Infants in this Facility is Prohibited by Federal
Law," and offering a toll-free confidential "Handicapped Infant Hotline" to
the DHHS or to a State Child Protective Agency. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630 (1983) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.61) (proposed Mar. 7, 1983, effective date Mar. 22,
1983).
18. Judge Gerhard Gesell struck down the rule as "arbitrary and capricious."
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 403 (1983). Al-
though the regulation was not properly promulgated in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551-59 (1982), American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 398-99 (1983), the court added that the
hotline would be intrusive and disruptive to the doctor-patient treatment pro-
cess. Id. at 401.
19. The Second Circuit struck a nearly fatal blow to the newest federal regula-
tions only weeks after they became effective. See infra notes 151-61 and ac-
companying text. United States v. University Hosp. at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d
144 (2d Cir. 1984), held that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
prohibiting handicapped discrimination (under which the new regulations
were promulgated), does not encompass treatment decisions for handi-
capped infants. See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. Therefore, ac-
cording to the court, the Department of Health and Human Services lacks
any statutory authority to investigate nontreatment cases or to compel pro-
duction of medical records. See infra note 151. The government may be re-
luctant to appeal the decision to the United States Supreme Court. If it loses
the appeal, it will very likely be forced out of the arena entirely.
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parents to choose a medically recommended course of treatment
or nontreatment for their child.20 That question, and a broader one
addressing the policies of withholding medical care from defective
newborns, have received varied treatment from commentators.
"Nontreatment" has been both decried 2' and acclaimed.22 Perhaps
the Baby Doe decision is simply an unpopular and relatively rare
one. It may be viewed as a trend toward the devaluation of handi-
capped life (and perhaps all weaker lives) and toward increasing
emphasis on those interests that compete with the infant's interest
in life-sustaining care.23 Perhaps, too, the decision reflects the nar-
row values and priorities of an increasingly selfish society.
Part II of this Article will examine those current statutes and
case law that should have helped Baby Doe, but which failed him
and may well fail others like him. Part III then provides a series of
standards which, if enacted, may save future Baby Doe infants.
II. THE LAW AS IT IS
The constitutional "right-to-life" is violated only when a state
wrongfully acts to abridge it.24 Clearly, no state action denied
20. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Ind. Cir. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 10, 1982);
In re Baby Doe, No. JV8204-038A (Ind. Juv. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 13, 1982).
See also Interview with attorney for Baby Doe's parents (Andrew C. Mallor),
quoted in Longino, supra, note 2, at 382 n.30.
21. One commentator observed: "The absence of due process for the infant is all
the more striking given the emotional circumstances of the parental decision
and the lack of publicly certified guidelines or criteria for withholding care.
We thus have a situation ... in which arbitrary and unjustified killings can
and have occurred." Robertson, supra note 6, at 268. See also In re Storar, 78
A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1980), within which one judge called withholding
treatment from a 52-year-old mentally retarded cancer victim "an unwar-
ranted and unconscionable intrusion upon the sanctity of human life." Id. at
1016, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 48 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
22. For example:
It may ... be that death has finally begun to emerge from our
psychic closet and that we may now be able to thoughtfully address
the potentially tragic by-product of medical science's assault upon
death [the ability to keep the very seriously ill alive]. As one who
participated in the [Quinlan] case I fervently hope for that result.
After all, the dying is the one minority to which we all belong.
Collester, supra, note 6 at 328. Cf. American Academy of Pediatrics Commit-
tee on Bioethics, Treatment of Critically Ill Newborns, 72 PEDIATRICS 565, 566
(1983) (supporting careful, thoughtful nontreatment decisions: "When the
infants prospects are for a life dominated by suffering, the concerns of the
family may play a larger role. Treatment should not be withheld for the pri-
mary purpose of improving the psychological or social well-being of others,
no matter how poignant those needs may be.").
23. See infra notes 197-201 & 224-30 and accompanying text.
24. The Constitution guarantees that "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
1984]
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Baby Doe life or equal protection; the decision was made by pri-
vate citizens.25 Each state has enacted sanctions against those citi-
zens who take another's life. 26 In addition, the Constitution
assures parents some degree of privacy in making certain deci-
sions by restricting state intrusions into that decision-making pro-
cess. 27 In Baby Doe's case, however, state laws arguably designed
to protect his well-being28 were apparently insufficient to subvert
the parents' right to make a private decision concerning that well-
being.29
State laws reflect and articulate state interests. Thus, it is im-
portant to examine those laws that bear directly on the nontreat-
ment issue. Various theories have been advanced. Child neglect
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend
XIV. As one of the Baby Doe judges noted:
Clearly, infants are afforded the same protection as adults, but the
important point to remember is that these Constitutional guarantees
concern the relation of the states to their citizens, not relations be-
tween citizens. The individual states are then left to regulate the
conduct of those within the state. This power is reserved to the
states in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, as limited by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Letter from Judge John G. Baker, special judge and Judge Pro-Tempore, In re
Baby Doe, No. JV8204-038A (Ind. Juv. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 13, 1982) [here-
inafter cited as Judge Baker Letter].
25. One may question whether judicial involvement is sufficient to constitute
state action, but that question is outside the scope of this Comment. But see
Judge Baker's remarks, infra note 29.
26. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-304 to -307 (1979). See also infra notes 178-85
and accompanying text.
27. Curiously, the same constitutional provisions that recognize a right to life
have been interpreted to grant a penumbral right of privacy and a substan-
tive due process protection for the liberty of parenthood. See, e.g., Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402
(1923). The concept of familial privacy with respect to the personal activities
of consenting adults, combined with an interest in preserving what may tradi-
tionally be considered a "natural right" of parental decisionmaking, together
may create a fundamental right in parents to determine what is best for the
child, and will require an overriding compelling state interest before the right
can be abridged. For a discussion of the policies for and against applying a
"strict scrutiny" standard-a standard by which only the most compelling
state interest may impinge upon a recognized fundamental constitutional
right-to those state laws which compete with a family's private decision-
making, see Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and
Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 1387-90 (1974).
28. See supra note 26.
29. One of the Baby Doe judges wrote that the case did not "deny that the State
retains a valid interest in preserving life where there is a clash of values. The
case of 'Infant Doe' simply was a difficult one where the State was required to
yield to the valid choice made by the parents." Judge Baker Letter, supra
note 24, at 3. The judge added: 'This Court represented the position of the
State, and my decision was not necessarily a reflection of my personal prefer-
ences as to the parents' decision." I&
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statutes have, for example, been most frequently invoked to
counter parents' nontreatment decisions. At first glance, neglect
law seems to provide sufficient protection for the newborn. The
results in cases applying these laws suggest otherwise. A second
theory asserts that the defective infant may be the victim of handi-
capped discrimination. This legal analysis is new, and as yet, rela-
tively untried. A fresh approach to long-standing discrimination
law and the arrival of new federal regulation indicate, however,
that this theory will receive greater attention in future. Clearly,
society has expressed its intent to protect the very young and the
disabled, since it has legislated for that purpose. But the defective
newborn controversy threatens to test the limits of that intent.
A. Child Neglect
1. Generally
One of the statutory strictures that should have been adequate
to protect Baby Doe was the Indiana child abuse and neglect law.30
Perhaps the most widely understood definition of neglect, and the
one which neglect statutes address, is a "chronic failure by adults
to protect children from obvious physical danger."31 Most statu-
tory language refers to physical harm, since there are definable
standards for measuring dangers of sickness, lack of basic physical
needs, and life-threatening situations.32 The following language
explains this reality:
Broadly speaking .... child neglect occurs when the dominant expec-
tations for parenthood are not met-when a parent fails to provide for a
child's needs according to the preferred values of the community. The le-
gal concept of neglect calls for consideration of rights and corresponding
duties as they arise within the tripartite interaction between child, family
and the state. The basic goal of any neglect statute is to prevent harm-
physical always, sometimes also psychological and social-from occurring
30. "Child abuse or neglect," as defined by IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-2 (Burns
1979), involves a child in need of services if:
(1) His physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seri-
ously endangered as a result of the inalbility, refusal, or neglect of his
parent... to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, education, or supervision; (2) His physical or mental
condition is seriously endangered due to injury by the act or omis-
sion of his parents, guardian, or custodian."
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-4-3(a) (1) (2) (Burns Supp. 1982).
31. Katz, Howe, & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAm. L Q. 1, 4
(1975).
32. Id. See S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAnL 22-23 (1971). NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-710
(Cum. Supp. 1982), defines abuse or neglect as "knowingly, intentionally, or
negligently causing or permitting a minor child or an incompetent or disabled
person to be: (a) Placed in a situation that endangers his or her life or physi-
cal or mental health; ... (c) deprived of necessary food, clothing, shelter, or
care...."
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to children. Determination of legal neglect is not merely, however, a ques-
tion of medical or even psychiatric judgment, but is essentially a social
policy issue. Primarily, neglect denotes conduct in conflict with the child-
rearing standards of the dominant culture, and determination of neglect is
based on social as well as legal judgments. 3 3
The "standards of the dominant culture" must to some extent
provide a commonly understood meaning of child neglect. Most
states do not have a statutory definition of "neglect" or of "ne-
glected child,"34 and simply refer to the neglected child in rather
broad terms. 35 The applicable state law in the Baby Doe case pro-
vided expressly for state intervention if the parent failed to pro-
vide, among other things, necessary food or medical care.36 A
number of states similarly structure their child neglect laws to spe-
cifically include a duty to provide medical assistance.37 Those
33. Katz, Howe, & McGrath, supra note 31, at 5.
34. Id. at 54-55. The article by authors Katz, Howe, and McGrath also provides a
thorough survey of child neglect laws' procedural hearings requirements,
statutory penalties, reporting requirements, and an analysis of parental fault-
based statutes. Id. at 58-63. These subjects do not fall within the scope of this
Article.
35. Arizona, for example, refers to a situation in which a child "lacks proper pa-
rental care necessary for his health and well-being." ARmz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-531(1) (1974).
36. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3 (Burns 1971), & 31-6-4-4 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1982).
The State of Indiana filed a Petition for Emergency Detention pursuant to
§ 31-6-4-4, asking the Monroe County Dept. of Public Welfare to take immedi-
ate custody of Baby Doe and provide him emergency treatment. In re Baby
Doe, No. JV8204-038A (Ind. Juv. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 13, 1982). The appli-
cable code provision states that "a child may be taken into custody by any
law enforcement officer under the order of the court." IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-
4-4(a) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1982). Finding 13, In re Baby Doe, No. JV8204-038A
(Ind. Juv. Ct., Monroe County Apr. 13, 1982), determined that unless Baby
Doe could be shown to be a "child in need of services" under IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-6-4-3 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1982), the court would not intervene. That code
section provides for a child whose "physical and mental condition is seriously
impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or ne-
glect of his parent ... to supply the child with necessary food ... [or] medi-
cal care... ." Id. Baby Doe was denied medical care: surgery, which, under
normal circumstances would have enabled him to take nourishment, was
withheld. Food was certainly denied as a result of the failure to provide med-
ical care, as evidenced by the fact the Baby Doe starved to death. The appli-
cation of the statute may really hinge on whether the denial of food and
surgery was really any serious impairment or endangerment to Baby Doe's
existing physical and mental condition.
37. A "typical" hypothetical model neglect law has been compiled:
First there will be a civil neglect purpose clause, stating that the
intent of the law is to be liberally construech to secure care, guidance
and discipline for each child, preferably in his own home; to preserve
and strengthen family ties whenever possible, removing him from
the care, custody and discipline of his parents, only when his welfare
or safety and the protection of the public cannot be adequately safe-
guarded without removal; and when removed, to secure care, custody
[Vol. 63:888
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states that do not expressly require such medical assistance usu-
ally construe the law as though that express language were pres-
ent.38 There is much disagreement about whether a statutory
definition of "neglected child" should be expanded to include those
children who receive necessary minimum '"protection, mainte-
and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should
have been given by his parents.
Second, there will be a "neglected child" definition that considers
a child as a person under 18 years of age, abandoned, and/or lacking
proper parental care, control or guardianship, and whose parent,
guardian or custodian refused or was unable to provide necessary
medica4 surgical or other special care made necessary by the child's
particular condition.
Third, the neglect hearing will provide for counsel, appointed
counsel, and appeal, but no trial by jury. The hearing will be infor-
mal, closed to the general public and transcribed. All records will be
deemed confidential. The statute will contain an evidentiary stan-
dard for determining neglect perhaps "by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, in accord with civil rules of procedure." There will be a range
of possible dispositional orders, including dismissal if the allegations
are not proved; temporary order for support, custody and protection;
protective supervision by the court in the child's own home; transfer
of legal custody to a public agency, institution or department, or to a
private licensed agency, or to a relative or other suitable person; and
examination and/or treatment of the child....
Fourth, there will be either a civil or a criminal penalty, imposing
a fine, an imprisonment or both.
Fifth, the required reporting of abuse under a mandatory statute
will include certain aspects of neglect. Immunities and waivers of
privileges, especially the physician-patient and husband-wife, will be
present.
Sixth, termination of parental rights will be possible following a
proceeding, separate from the neglect hearing....
And seventh, it may have as a special clause only the waiver of
disability from an adjudication of the status of "neglected child."
There will be no provisions for guardians ad litem, spiritual healing
exemptions, or religious preference in placement clauses.
Katz, Howe, & McGrath, supra, note 31, at 70-71 (emphasis added).
38. See State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), where Jehovah's Wit-
ness parents refused their newborn son recommended blood transfusions to
treat heart and lung and possible neurological problems present at birth. The
child's chances of dying were "two or three-times greater" if he did not have
the blood transfusions. The transfusions probably would have saved the
child's life, and probably would have alleviated the physical and neurological
trouble, as well. Id at 465, 181 A.2d at 754. This chance for improvement may
provide a crucial distinction between Perricone and Baby Doe. See infra
notes 107-12 and accompanying text. The Perricone child's death did not
moot the issue of whether the parents were "neglectful" under state law,
which provided that custody may be taken from parents when they neglect to
provide "proper protection, maintenance, and education." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2-9 (West 1948). Note that while New Jersey had a definition of child ne-
glect that included failure to provide "medical attendance or surgical treat-
ment," id § 9:6-1, the court focused on the broader language, and did not need
the specific "medical care" language to find the parents neglectful. State v.
Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 466, 181 A-2d 751, 755 (1962).
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nance, and education,"3 9 but who are unloved or unstimulated.40
However, there is general agreement that failure to provide medi-
cal care, where that failure could result in death or serious injury,
is clearly within the scope of child neglect law.4 1
2. Exceptions to the Parental Duty
a. Impossibility and Substantial Risk: The Established
Exceptions
There are, of course, certain exceptions to the parental duty4 2 to
provide medical care for minor children. A parent has no obliga-
tion to do the impossible.43 Thus, a "father who cannot swim need
not dive into deep water to rescue his drowning child."44 If there is
no treatment available for a child, then obviously, none can be at-
tempted. This notion of "impossibility" may form the roots of a
doctrine that withholding treatment from defective newborns con-
stitutes "extraordinary care": that which need not, or arguably
should not, be done.45 It may be, then, that heroic efforts to save or
39. See supra note 38.
40. Katz, Howe, & McGrath, supra note 31, at 4. See Areen, Intervention Between
Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and
Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L. J. 887, 927 (1975).
41. Katz, Howe, & McGrath, supra note 31, at 56. See Maine Medical Center v.
Houle, Civ. No. 74-145 (Me. Super. Ct. Cumberland County, 1974), where par-
ents' refusal to consent to surgery to effectuate normal feeding and breathing
was neglect. See generally, Robertson, supra note 6, at 222.
42. Clearly, there is a duty. Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 139 N.W. 676, affid on reh'g,
94 Neb. 151, 142 N.W. 670 (1913). In Stehr, the defendant was convicted of
manslaughter for negligently causing the death of his four-year-old stepson
when he allowed the fire in the house to go out, exposing the child to the
elements. Although the parents tried home remedies, no doctor was sum-
moned for over two weeks, and the boy died of gangrene. The court held that:
"One charged with the support and control of a child of tender years ... who
negligently or willfully fails or refuses to obtain for it necessary medical aid,
thereby causing its death, .. . may be guilty of manslaughter." Id. at 755, 139
N.W. at 676. The court noted further that manslaughter was a consequence of
such culpable neglect, even though the death or serious bodily harm which
resulted was unintentional, and that if a parent does not have the means to
obtain medical aid, he has the duty to obtain public assistance. It. at 760, 139
N.W. at 678.
43. In Port Huron v. Jenkinson, 77 Mich. 414, 43 N.W. 923 (1889), the court held
unconstitutional an ordinance penalizing one who failed to do an impossible
act.
44. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRnuNAL LAw 188 (1972). "But impossibility means
impossibility." Id. Thus, a poverty-stricken father would not be criminally
liable for his child's death from starvation if it were impossible to get food,
but he would be liable if he failed to seek available help to obtain the food.
Id. at 188-89. Accord Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 766, 139 N.W. 676, 678 (1913).
45. See infra note 279.
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to treat seriously defective newborns 4 6 that would have a minimal
effect or produce negligible results may be neither morally com-
pelled nor legally dictated by duty.47
A parent may not have an obligation to take measures to pro-
vide medical care that is highly risky or experimental. Certain
treatments may be effective if successful, but may carry with them
great risk of death or serious harm if unsuccessful. If the
probability of harm outweighs the probability of success, there
may be no duty to take the chance.48 Likewise, when the effect of
treatment is unknown, that is, it may help the child but the likeli-
hood of benefit is unpredictable or uncertain, nontreatment could
be justified.49
In re Green,50 for example, involved a six-year-old victim of
sickle-cell anemia whose mother refused to consent to blood trans-
fusions for the child despite several doctors' recommendations. 51
46. A "severely defective newborn" has been defined as an infant who is "not
likely to survive without surgical and medical intervention and whose prog-
nosis, even assuming this intervention, may be poor in terms of cognitive life
and minimal functioning." Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?,
7 Am. J. LAW & MED. 393, 394 (1983). Although Ellis attempts to focus this
definition by providing examples of severe defects (e.g., Myelomeningocele,
Trisomy 21 or Down's Syndrome, Anencephaly, Trisomy 13, Encephalomen-
ingocele, Severe Perinatal Trauma), he nonetheless admits that, due to the
variety and degrees of severity of defects and limited medical knowledge,
"[a] more precise definition is impractical and inappropriate at this point."
Id.
47. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). New federal regulation
agrees, and "does not require that futile treatments, which will do no more
than prolong the act of dying, be provided." 49 Fed. Reg. 1,643 (1984) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.55). This distinction may have escaped those who
have a tendency to regard every treatment case as an overtreatment case.
See, e.g., Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheo-
sis?, 63 NEB. L. REv. 709, 726-28 (1984).
48. See 49 Fed. Reg. 1,636 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.55).
49. See, e.g., In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009,419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979)
(allowing parents to administer experimental laetrile to their son pursuant to
the advice of a doctor who believed in its efficacy). But see In re Custody of a
Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, affd, 393 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1978), the famous Chad
Green case, after which parents of the leukemia victim fled with him to Mex-
ico to escape a court order for chemotherapy and forbidding further laetrile
treatment.
50. 12 CRIME & DELiNQ. 377 (Milwaukee County Ct. Wis. 1966).
51. The mother refused consent partly out of fear that her child would die, and
partly on religious grounds, but the religious grounds were held not to be just
cause for the refusal. Id. at 381. See also Jehovah's Witnesses v. Kings
County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968);
People ex rel Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344
U.S. 824 (1952). The Green court distinguished these cases as involving "seri-
ous and acute medical problems demanding prompt attention with little or no
alternative offered and usually optimistic prognostications as to recovery or
benefit." In re Green, 12 CRIME & DELINQ. 377, 381 (Milwaukee County Ct. Wis.
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The transfusions were experimental at that time. There was no
reliable treatment for the disease. Although the blood disorder
was incurable even with the transfusion treatments, transfusions
could correct a dangerous blood deficiency during certain "crisis"
periods when the boy became acutely ill. The risk of death absent
treatment was extremely high during these "crisis" periods, but
thus far, the child had survived.
The court upheld the mother's decision and refused to find
child neglect.52 The court agreed that "[w] here there is imminent
possibility of loss of life or further serious disability due to inac-
tion," treatment would be ordered.53 Nonetheless, it held that
where the efficacy of the proposed treatment is "doubtful,5 4 and
the treatment itself risks serious harm or death to the child, a re-
fusal to submit the child to that treatment will not constitute ne-
glect.55 Similarly, unless nontreatment means imminent harm or
risk of death, a court may not intervene (even though without the
prescribed course of treatment the child would be much less
healthy, or might be permanently socially handicapped) so long as
there is sufficient risk in the treatment itself.5 6
1966) (emphasis added). Cf Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d
1053 (1978) (court ordered chemotherapy for a child who would die within
several weeks without it, but had a 50-50 chance of survival with the
treatment).
52. In re Green, 12 CRIME & DELINQ. 377, 384 (Milwaukee County Ct. Wis. 1966).
53. Id, See also People ex rel Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) (ordering a transfusion because medical testimony
indicated that the child would almost certainly die without it).
54. In Green, effectiveness of the treatment was found to be "seriously doubtful";
presumably, this "serious doubt" would be the catchphrase for the test, since
mere "doubt" (rather than "serious doubt") could be cast on practically
every medical procedure with any risk attached.
55. But see In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561 (1912). In Tuttendario, although seven
out of the ten children in the family had died in infancy (and thus there was
some possibility of an inherent low resistance or weakness to disease or trau-
matic experience common to every child of those parents), an operation that
probably could have provided recovery for a child suffering from ricketts was
not ordered by the court when parents refused to consent to the operation
because they feared losing another child.
The Green court also implied that if the mother's nonreligious reasons for
refusing to consent to her son's treatment were "logical, reasonable, and
made in good faith," the refusal might be afforded more weight. In re Green,
12 CRIME & DELINQ. 377, 385 (Milwaukee County Ct. Wis. 1966). A test of logic,
reason, and good faith could, however, be problematic. It might too broadly
allow nontreatment decisions for what certain circumstances might dictate
are the "wrong" reasons (for example, financial hardship or marital stress),
no matter how well-grounded in logic and good faith.
56. See, e.g., In re Hudson, 13 Wash.2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (addressing a par-
ent's good faith decision that it is unwise and dangerous to permit recom-
mended surgery). In Hudson, a twelve-year-old girl had a congenital
deformity in the form of a huge, heavy, abnormal growth on her left arm,
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In the Baby Doe case, the surgical procedure recommended was
neither impossible nor experimental.5 7 Further, Baby Doe did not
involve a situation in which the child could or would lead merely
an inhibited, sickly or sub-normal life if the treatment were fore-
gone. The risk of death to Baby Doe without the corrective surgery
was imminent; in fact, it was inevitable.58
b. Quality of Life Prognosis: An Emerging Exception
Another possible exception to a parent's duty to provide medi-
cal care has emerged relatively recently.59 The basis for this ex-
ception lies in the belief that there may be no duty to sustain life
when the prognosis for "cognizant, sapient,"60 productive life is
very poor.6 1 It follows that if the prognosis is "hopeless"-even
which made it longer than the right arm and rendered it useless. Physicians
recommended amputation because her afflication was, among other things,
burdening her heart and increasing her susceptibility to infection. The court
held that the girl was not a neglected child under state law, and that the court
could not subject the child to an operation over the parent's objection. Id. at
712, 126 P.2d at 783. The dissenting opinion vigorously argued that the child
had a right to as normal a life as possible and that the parents had a duty to
provide medical and surgical care and to make their decision about the opera-
tion free from selfish, personal interests. Id. at 733, 126 P.2d at 791 (Simpson,
J., dissenting).
57. In fact, such surgery is typically successful PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra
note 4, at 203. A Bloomington Hospital doctor described Baby Doe as "an
infant with... reparable esophageal atresia and tracheoesophageal fistula."
Pless Letter, supra, note 2.
58. The risk of death to Baby Doe with the corrective surgery that his parents
refused is open to debate. Some authorities assert that the child very proba-
bly would not have survived the operation. Others argue that the child had at
least a 50-50 chance for survival, and therefore the risk of harm through treat-
ment may have been less than the risk of harm through nontreatment. See
PRESInENr'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 203; Bannon, supra note 3, at 67;
Longino, supra note 2, at 382, n.30. The risks of surgery were not expressly
mentioned by the Baby Doe courts, nor was any evidence admitted regarding
the success rate of the operation. The court accepted only that surgery was
one medically recommended course of treatment. Regardless of the risks in-
volved, it is certain that whatever Baby Doe's chances of survival were with
the surgery, they were better than nothing-which was his chance for sur-
vival without surgery.
59. The "quality of life" assessment has an appealing ring to it, but is an ex-
tremely difficult term to define. One author equates it with the "substituted
judgment" doctrine (the concepts are related), Smith, supra note 47, at 734
and later implies that parents and courts must have a "feel" for it. Id. at 730-
31. The first assertion is inexact, and the second, although perhaps accurate,
is dreadfully inadequate.
60. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 55, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (1976).
61. In 1949, a doctor commented on the absurdity of medical care which is based
on
rational principles and economy and not on humane compassion and
devine law. To be sure, American physicians are still far from the
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though, technically, life itself is sustainable 62-- a parent may not be
guilty of neglect when the quality of that child's life will be ex-
tremely poor 63 even with treatment. This "quality of life" analysis
attempts to determine the kind of life the child will have, and the
degree to which he will experience life, if he is given treatment.6
Accordingly, a quality of life analysis presumes that a parent's fail-
ure to provide medical care is justified if the infant's life with treat-
ment would have no measurable value.65
This "poor prognosis" exception is distinguishable from the im-
possible,66 the experimental, 67 or the dangerous measures 68 par-
point of thinking of killing centers, but they have arrived at a danger
point in thinking, at which likelihood of full rehabilitation is consid-
ered a factor that should determine the amount of time, effort and
cost to be devoted to a ... patient.
Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEW ENG. J. MED. 39, 41
(1949).
62. Advances in medicine now make it possible to sustain lives that would have
until recently been unsavable, "although some will be severely handicapped
and limited in their potential for human satisfaction and interaction." Rob-
ertson, supra note 6, at 214. The President's Commission stated that: "For
almost any life-threatening condition, some intervention can now delay the
moment of death. Frequent dramatic breakthroughs ... have made it possi-
ble to retard and even to reverse many conditions that were until recently
regarded as fatal." PRESIDENT'S COM'N REP., supra note 4, at 1. See Com-
ment, Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborns: Substituted Judg-
ment, Informed Consent, and the Quinlan Decision, 13 GONZ. L. REv. 781, 781-
82 (1978).
63. Of course, every quality of life judgment requires some subjective assess-
ment of what is "poor" life and what is not. An infant's quality of life may be
materially affected by the seriousness of his mental impairment or his physi-
cal deformity, the pain he must endure, and the potential he has for sharing
various human experiences. See Note, Birth Defective Infants: A Standard
for Nontreatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REv. 599, 620-21 (1978). Quality of life
may be extremely difficult to define and to consistently apply. For example,
one illustration suggests an evaluation of which child would have a better
quality of life prognosis: a defective infant or a ghetto child with alcoholic
parents? In other words, the values by which we define quality of life have
not been comfortably agreed upon. Id. at 621, n.114 (citing S. Law, Constitu-
tional Right to Privacy (unpublished paper)).
64. Implicit in a discussion of the quality of life evaluation with respect to non-
treatment decisions is consideration both of the extraordinary nature of the
medical care, and of the medical feasibility of the treatment. See infra note
279.
65. See Note, supra note 63, at 599-600 (citing Tooley & Phibbs, Neonatal Intensive
Care: The State of the Art, in ETmcs OF NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE 22 (1976)).
But cf. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942), where treatment would
have greatly improved the child's physical, psychological and emotional well-
being, but the court upheld the mother's refusal to consent because the treat-
ment was not lifesaving, and because the child could make the decision her-
self in a few short years. The implications of a quality of life analysis become
much more serious in a life-threatening situation.
66. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 63:888
BABY DOE DECISIONS
ents may reasonably refuse. The treatment may be possible, safe,
and even have proven successful for the ailment being treated.
However, it may still not improve appreciably the child's chances
for any quality of life commensurate with some capacity for those
human experiences that give life its depth and texture.6 9 Increas-
ingly, this "quality of life" argument is advanced to justify termi-
nating treatment for defective newborns. 70 Its proponents argue
that the prognosis is not good for "meaningful" life, or, alternately,
that prolonged life would mean prolonged misery, characterized by
continuous, intrusive, painful treatments, and little else.71
The quality of life standard first surfaced in a controversial case
involving a twenty-year-old girl who lapsed into an irreversible
coma.72 Karen Quinlan remained in a "debilitated and allegedly
moribund state,"73 and continued to physically deteriorate. She
was not, however, "brain dead,"74 so the doctors caring for her re-
67. In re Green, 12 CRIE & DELiNQ. 377 (Milwaukee County Ct. Wis. 1966). See
supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. The notion of weighing the
substantial benefit of treatment against the risk of serious harm with or with-
out treatment is closely akin to a quality of life prognosis, though more exact.
69. A much-cited doctor asserts that capacity for "meaningful humanhood"-de-
termined by such factors as the capacity to love and to understand, and the
potential for independence and to plan a future-should be considered in a
treatment decision. Comment, supra note 62, at 788 (citing Dr. Raymond
DufFs theories in Kelsey, Which Infants Should Live? Who Should Decide?, 5
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1975, at 5, 6). Other commentators have estab-
lished various tests for determining "personhood," both from a quality of life
perspective and perhaps ultimately in a conditional sense. One argues that a
sense of self is necessary for personhood, since birth does not automatically
bestow that characteristic. This sense of self stems from a desire "to con-
tinue existing as a subject of experiences and other mental states," and thus,
"an entity that lacks such a consciousness.., does not have a right to life,"
that is, a right to something is necessarily connected to the desire to have it.
Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 Pin. & PuB. AFFAims 37, 49 (1972). An-
other suggests that a minimal level of intelligence, measured by I.Q., be a
requirement before an entity be labeled "person." Fletcher, Indicators of
Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man, 2 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1972,
at 1, 1-4. One theory has traditionally maintained that the immortal soul can-
not enter the body until that body is sufficiently formed (40-90 days). Atkin-
son, Persons in the Whole Sense, 22 AM. J. Juis 86, 91 (1977). See also
Robertson, supra note 6, at 248. Yet another doctor confesses that before he
decides to forego treatment, he determines what sort of life the infant will
have with treatment by judging whether the child is "able to give and receive
love." Dr. David Abramson, quoted in Comment, The Legacy of Infant Doe, 34
BAYLOR L. REv. 699, 704 (1982).
70. See Note, supra note 63, at 620.
71. See PRESMENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 219.
72. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
73. Id. at 12, 355 A.2d at 651.
74. A team at Harvard Medical School defined "brain death," and the standards
for determining "brain death" have been part of the legal definition of
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fused her parents' request to remove her from a life-sustaining 75
respirator. On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted the
request, convinced that "the focal point of decision should be the
prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of return to cognitive and
sapient life, as distinguished from the forced continuance of a bio-
logical vegetative existence" to which the court felt Karen was
"doomed."76
The Quinlan decision implies that "quality of life" is a higher
good to which traditional notions about the sanctity of human life
must yield. If circumstances allow society to refuse to sustain a
life so that nature may terminate it,77 if this emerging "exception"
means that only quality lives are worthy of protection beyond pa-
rental discretion, then the Baby Doe progeny are the children
doomed. A quality of life standard assumes that at some point a
defective baby would no longer wish to be sustained,78 and that
"death" in many states. See Ufford, Brain Death! Termination of Heroic Ef-
forts to Save Life-Who Decides?, 19 WASHBURN LJ. 225, 229-35 (1980). The
Harvard definition requires: (1) unresponsiveness to normally painful stim-
uli; (2) absence of spontaneous movements or breathing; (3) absence of re-
flexes; and (4) no change 24 hours later. See generally A Definition of
Irreversible Coma, 205 J. A.M.A. 85 (1968). Brain death has also been defined
as "the permanent loss of all integrated neuronal brain function." Ufford,
supra, at 227-28. Testimony in Quinlan revealed that no physician would
have failed to put Karen on a respirator initially, and no physician would be
willing to terminate the respirator, once it had been administered as lifesav-
ing treatment, absent brain death. However, the court looked at testimony
that implied a quality of life assessment: 'The subject has lost human quali-
ties... [M] ajor surgical procedures would [probably] be out of the question
even if they were known to be essential for continued physical existence." In
re Quinlan 70 N.J. 10, 18, 355 A.2d 647, 657 (1976).
75. At least one commentator distinguishes between lifesaving care and life-pro-
longing or -sustaining care, which is therapeutic or emergency treatment that
"amounts to no more than efforts to prolong the life of a terminally ill,
noncognitive patient." Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or to Withhold Medical
Treatment: The Emerging Technology and Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13
CREIGHTON L. REV. 795, 823 (1980). After several unsuccessful attempts to
wean Karen from the respirator, she was successfully weaned after the court
upheld her father's decision to withdraw treatment. Brown & Truitt, Eutha-
nasia and the Right to Die, 3 Omo N.U.L. REv. 615, 628 (1976).
76. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 51, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (1976). In addition to its "quality
of life" language, Quinlan is also frequently cited with respect to the "right to
die" as a necessary consequence of the right to privacy. See Brown & Truitt,
supra note 75, at 628. See infra notes 187-201 and accompanying text, for dis-
cussion of a child's best interests including consideration of a right to die.
Consistent with the right to die is some consideration of Quinlan as a pioneer
case permitting euthanasia.
77. See Sharp & Crofts, Death With Dignity, the Physician's Civil Liability, 27
BAYLOR L. REv. 86, 87 (1975) (citing Fletcher, 75 AM. J. NtmSING 671 (1975)).
78. Distinct but implicit here is the doctrine of "substituted judgment," whereby
anyone with decisionmaking rights regarding the treatment of another will
make the decision standing in the shoes of the other, and make the choice the
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nontreatment is acceptable, even desirable. A philosophy of care
premised upon this assumption leads to the inevitable conclusion
that death at that point is better than life.79 One Baby Doe judge
reached just that conclusion: "It is a harsh view that no life is pref-
erable to life, but the great weight of the medical testimony at the
hearing I conducted was that even if the proposed surgery was suc-
cessful, the possibility of a minimally adequate quality of life was
non-existent."8 0
Quinlan is, however, readily distinguishable from Baby Doe,
and the same rationale need not invariably apply. Baby Doe was
not in a vegetative mental state; he was mentally retarded. He re-
quired surgery to correct his physical defect, not life-prolonging,
continuous attachment to machinery. Finally, the standard for de-
termining what Baby Doe's quality of life would have been was
summoned from the perspective of an ordinary, healthy human be-
ing deciding for the infant. This standard might, arguably, have
been appropriate to evaluate the prospective life of a once-healthy
young woman who had lived a normal life for twenty years. It is,
however, inappropriate when applied to a mentally retarded child
who has not had the opportunity to experience life to the extent
other would probably have, to the extent that is possible. Substituted judg-
ment must be asserted on behalf of the incompetent in his or her best inter-
ests. See Comment, supra note 62, at 791. The "substituted judgment"
doctrine exists ostensibly to guard an incompetent patient's right to privacy
in medical treatment (and therefore, often the "right to die"), and has been
asserted to be "the only practical way to prevent destruction of [that] right."
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
79. It may be logically and legally absurd to assert that nonexistence is prefera-
ble to defective life. See Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for Wrongful Life, 1
ISRAEL L. REV. 513, 537 (1966) (using Quinlan as precedent). It has been held
that infant plaintiffs have no cause of action in "wrongful life" cases to be
compensated for the physical and mental suffering they endure for having
been born. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978). Such a
cause of action would demand "a calculation of damages dependent upon a
comparison between... life in an unimpaired state and nonexistence." Id.
at 412,386 N.E.2d at 812. Another court denied a claim for wrongful life, not on
the difficulty in measuring damages, but because the child had suffered no
injury which the law recognized, since "life-whether experienced with or
without a major physical handicap-is more precious than non-life." Berman
v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 429, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979).
80. Judge Baker Letter, supra note 24, at 2. It is extremely difficult to resolve
Judge Baker's determination that Baby Doe's quality of life was "non-exis-
tent" for even a "minimally adequate" prognosis, considering the facts that
the severity of the Down's Syndrome could not have been reliably forecast at
the time of the hearing (April 15, 1982), see supra note 3 and accompanying
text, and that the other Baby Doe affliction (esophageal trouble) was "repara-
ble." See Pless Letter, supra note 4, and accompanying text. The difficulty of
such a resolution illustrates that quality-of-life standards, without more, are
simply too subjective and broad to be workable. See supra notes 59-71 & 77-80
and accompanying text.
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that he is able, and may never fully realize how "unhappy" his lot
in life is, compared to that of the "normal" lives around him.81 This
absence of an appropriate vantage point from which to make accu-
rate judgments about the quality of individual lives, 82 coupled with
a potential for error,83 provide strong reasons to avoid adopting a
quality of life exception to neglect.84 This will be particularly true
without narrower strictures to limit the discretionary power of the
decisionmakers-be they doctors, parents or courts.
c. The Next Exception
It is too early to determine if the Bloomington, Indiana decision
was merely anomaly,8 5 or whether it may pave the way for the for-
mal adoption of an exception to a parent's responsibility to care for
his or her minor children. This exception would permit parents of
a child born with both a permanent handicap and a life-threaten-
ing correctible defect to refuse the corrective treatment. The more
advanced medical science becomes, the greater the essential
knowledge and the opportunity to keep alive newborns who would
not previously have survived.86 As the opportunity grows, the
number of nontreatment decisions will conceivably escalate pro-
portionately. Judicial endorsement of such decisions can only in-
81. Studies show that handicapped persons commit suicide far less often than
non-handicapped persons, and psychological tests reveal that they are glad
rather than sorry they were born and that they are hopeful about their future.
See Diamond, The Deformed Child's Right to Life, in DEATH, DYING AND Eu-
THANASIA 133 (1977).
82. See also In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 2d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980) (see infra note 221 for a discussion of Phillip B.).
83. See D. WALTON, ETHics OF WrrHDRAwAL OF LIFE-SUPPORT SYSTEMS 84 (1983).
Karen Quinlan was eventually successfully weaned from her "life-prolong-
ing" respirator. See Collester, supra note 6, at 305.
84. See Comment, The Legacy of Infant Doe, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 699, 704 (1982).
85. One author remarked that Baby Doe is the first instance where courts have
approved a course of action in which withholding treatment from a defective
newborn would lead to certain death. Longino, supra note 2, at 382 n.30. But
see Comment, supra note 62, at 787, where it was reported that a Maryland
Down's Syndrome baby with an intestinal blockage died of starvation over
fifteen days when parents refused to consent to corrective surgery for the
intestinal problem. In Horan, Euthanasia, Medical Treatment and the Mon-
goloid Child: Death as a Treatment of Choice?, 27 BAYLOR L REV. 76, 77
(1975), a case "in Decatur" is noted, where a child with an esophageal prob-
lem, believed also to have Down's Syndrome, was not given treatment.
Brown & Truitt, supra note 75, at 632, discuss a Detroit, Mich., child with intes-
tinal problems precluding feeding who was denied corrective surgery pursu-
ant to a decision by the parents in consultation with the pediatrician. The
child received surgery upon court order, after an anonymous report to the
police via a newspaper "action line."
86. See Note, supra note 63, at 599-600 (citing Tooley & Phibbs, Neonatal Intensive
Care: The State of the Art, in ETHIcs OF NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE 22 (1976)).
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crease the frequency with which parents will invoke this new
exception.
Just a decade ago, in Maine Medical Center v. Houle,87 a trial
court in Maine exercised its jurisdiction under the doctrine of
parens patriae88 "to care for infants and protect them from ne-
glect,"89 and overruled the parents' decision to withhold medical
care from a child much like Baby Doe. The child was born with
certain birth defects: no left eye, rudimentary left ear without an
ear canal, malformed left thumb, and tracheoesophageal fistula.90
Since, as with Baby Doe, the esophageal problem precluded nor-
mal feeding, the child was fed intravenously,9 ' and surgery was
recommended. Within forty-eight hours, the child's father asked
that the intravenous feedings 92 be stopped, and that corrective sur-
gery be foregone. The court, however, issued an order to maintain
the child "in a stable and viable condition,"93 and restrained the
parents from ordering any course "which, in the opinion of the at-
tending physician, would be injurious to the current medical situa-
tion of said child."94 Within the next few critical days, the child
suffered seizures and required some artificial respiratory aid. In
addition, since the first nontreatment request by the parents, med-
ical evaluation revealed "virtual certainty of some brain dam-
age." 95 After this more recent evaluation, the attending physician
87. Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Civ. No. 74-145 (Me. Super. Ct. Cumberland
County 1974).
88. The parens patriae doctrine enables the state to act as "the general guardian
of all infants, idiots and lunatics." Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257
(1972). The statutory scheme of any individual state's child neglect laws, to-
gether with the common law right and duty of parens patriae, is the basis for
judicial intervention or approbation in nontreatment decisions. See Clarke,
supra note 75, at 814.
89. Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Civ. No. 74-145 (Me. Super. Ct. Cumberland
County 1974). No particular statute was invoked since the state's parens pa-
triae authority provided the power for intervention. See supra note 88.
90. See supra note 4. Baby Doe also was born with this esophageal ailment.
91. According to the limited information available, Baby Doe was not fed intrave-
nously pending any surgical decisions. See Pless Letter, supra note 2.
92. The largely academic question may be raised: to what extent were the Houle
baby's intravenous feedings simply a life-prolonging measure, like Karen
Quinlan's respirator, the withdrawal of which might be termed active eutha-
nasia? See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
93. Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Civ. No. 74-145 (Me. Super. Ct. Cumberland
County 1974).
94. Id- Note that, in contrast to Baby Doe's situation, there was no dispute
among physicians (at first), and the parents' desire to withhold treatment-at
least initially-was not made pursuant to any medically recommended
course of treatment, a seemingly crucial element in Baby Doe. See supra
note 4.
95. Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Civ. No. 74-145 (Me. Super. Ct. Cumberland
County 1974).
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concluded that without surgery the child would certainly die, and
that with surgery the child could survive, albeit brain-damaged to
some unknown degree.96 The physician recommended "that all
life supporting measures.., be withdrawn."97
The only appreciable distinction between the facts in Houle and
those in Baby Doe is that the Houle child was given some life-
maintaining medical care-intravenous feeding and periodic artifi-
cial respiration-pending resolution in the courts. Medical atten-
tion provided to the Houle baby was surely the result of quick
judicial response favorable to treatment, and an initial absence of
medically recommended nontreatment. 98 The case did not remark
on the fact that nontreatment would mean a withdrawing of life-
saving treatment already administered,99 as well as a refusal to un-
dertake any further treatment. Instead, the Houle court focused
on and expressly discarded any quality of life consideration:
"[T] he issue.., is not the prospective quality of the life to be pre-
served, but the medical feasibility of the proposed treatment com-
pared with the almost certain risk of death should treatment be
withheld."100
This analysis is clearly consistent with those decisions that
weigh the risk of harm with the substantial benefit to the child in
determining whether to treat.101 What factors, then, could permit a
situation whereby the parents of one mentally defective baby with
a surgically correctable esophagus problem could withhold lifesav-
ing treatment, when the parents of a different mentally defective
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 7. It has been suggested that while Baby Doe's esophageal
defect was reparable, his chances of surviving the operation may have been
no greater than 50 percent by the time he died; but, had the surgery been
ordered over the parents' wishes at first opportunity, chances of survival
would have been quite good. See Bannon, supra note 3, at 68; Longino, supra
note 2, at 382 n.30. See also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
99. This was perhaps comparable to the Quinlan situation, where it was simply
unthinkable for the doctors to fail to initiate respiratory support, but once the
life-sustaining treatment was administered, withdrawing it would be contrary
to medical standards, practice and ethics. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 18, 355
A.2d 647, 657 (1976). The focus probably should be on the necessary treat-
ment initially provided, and not on whether that treatment may legally per-
missibly be discontinued. Otherwise, health care personnel might hesitate to
give treatment in the first place, preferring to risk doubtful liability for pas-
sive nontreatment rather than probable liability for active euthanasia. See
Barber v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195
Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (doctors acquitted of murder when IV's supplying food
and water were equated with life-support equipment).
100. Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Civ. No. 74-145 (Me. Super. Ct. Cumberland
County 1974).
101. See supra notes 48-56, and accompanying text.
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baby with the same correctable problem would undoubtedly have
been guilty of child neglect for the same deliberate omission? The
situation cries out for uniformity in the law and uniformity in ap-
plication of that law. Without it, broad statutory language is ig-
nored, or interpreted to fit a neglect controversy that the
lawmakers may have never anticipated.102
3. Problems with Neglect Law
a. Interpretation
The difficulty in defining child neglect for nontreatment situa-
tions may be the result of problems with interpretation, both of
statutory language and of case law. In In re Cicero,0 3 for example,
the court appointed a guardian to consent to treatment for an in-
fant born with spina bifida.104 This infant would probably have
died within six months without corrective surgery, but had a hand-
icapped life expectancy of perhaps twenty years with surgery.1 05
The court did not specifically find neglect on the part of the par-.
ents. It did use the state neglect law as authority for intervention
since the infant fell within the purview of the statutory "neglected
child" definition. The law defined such a child as one who is in
"imminent danger of becoming impaired" as a result of the par-
ents' failure to exercise a "minimum degree of care" in supplying
the child with "adequate surgical care.'1 06 Although that language
was interpreted by the Cicero court to require treatment for the
spina bifida baby, it is certainly not clear that another court would
reach the same conclusion.
The statute invoked in Baby Doe also contained the language
102. It is hoped that new handicapped discrimination regulation will help estab-
lish this much-needed uniformity: 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622 (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. § 84.55). See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
103. 101 Misc. 2d 699, 41 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
104. Spina bifida involves abnormal development of the brain or spinal cord. It
may be marked by an external saccular protusion from the spine, and causes
physical and/or mental handicaps widely ranging in severity and frequently
involving many organ systems, urinary tract deficiency, paralysis of the lower
extremities, and hydrocephaly (increase of free fluid in the cranial cavity re-
sulting in a marked enlargement of the head and many and varied other com-
plications and defects). See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 202;
Robertson, supra note 6, at 213 nn.4 & 6 (citing J. WARKANY, CONGENrrAL MAL-
FORMATONS 217-18, 272,286-88 (1971)). Some spina bifida victims have normal
intelligence and can lead independent lives. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra
note 4, at 202.
105. In re:Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 700, 41 N.Y.S.2d 965, 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979). See also
Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63
(1983) (the Infant Jane Doe case).
106. In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 41 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
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"imminent danger of becoming impaired."107 Similar "impair-
ment" terms in other states' laws' 08 might also not apply to situa-
tions in which a child is born seriously impaired, since that child is
arguably in imminent danger only of living in continued impair-
ment or of dying from the impairment.109 The court in Cicero did
not consider this analysis, but it might have: the spinal disorder
certain to kill the Cicero baby if no treatment was administered
may not have been "impaired" further by allowing the child to suc-
cumb' 10 to death. Some would argue that, given the seriousness of
the birth defect, death would be not an impairment but an
improvement."'
With this analysis in mind, a child neglect statute-if it is truly
intended to apply to the withholding of aggressive medical treat-
ment from Baby Doe infants-might be considered underinclusive.
Arguably, it is meant to protect not only those children in "immi-
nent danger of becoming impaired," but also those defective
newborns which cannot "become" any more impaired. The statu-
tory language, however, simply does not adequately embrace those
children. Neglect laws clearly contemplate protecting children
who are relatively normal at the outset, but who later require and
then are denied medical attention.1 2 The defective newborn
emerges from the womb in a less-than-healthy state, however, and
may not be regarded as a child that the neglect statutes intended
to protect. Indeed, a "Baby Doe" situation may not have even been
imagined.
Neglect statute interpretation difficulties compound when a
court flavors an already liberal reading with an analysis of the
child's prognosis with treatment. The Baby Doe courts probably
made quality of prospective life a consideration,113 and the Cicero
107. In re Baby Doe, No. JV8204-038A (Ind. Juv. Ct., Monroe County Apr. 13, 1982).
108. For example, Nebraska law couches abuse and neglect in terms of placing the
child in a situation which would endanger his life or health or depriving the
child of necessary care. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-707 to -710 (1979).
109. Consider whether certain death can be deemed an "impairment" of an al-
ready existing very poor physical and/or mental condition. See supra notes
77-80 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 5.
111. See supra note 109.
112. See generally IJA-ABA JOnT COMAUSSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS,
STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1981); Katz, Howe & McGrath,
supra note 31.
113. Judge Baker stated:
[T]he great weight of the medical testimony at the hearing I con-
ducted was that even if the proposed surgery was successful, the pos-
sibility of a minimally adequate quality of life was non-existent....
[Where religion is not an issue] the decision of the court will...
depend on the prognosis for the patient if treatment is administered.
Judge Baker Letter, supra note 24, at 2.
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court most certainly did.114 The difficulty with such a considera-
tion is that the child neglect statutes do not allow for the analysis.
We may assume that defective newborns are within the contem-
plation of the statutes, and that a decision to withhold necessary
medical treatment where there is a risk of death is within their
purview. If that is true, then the guidelines for a quality of life de-
termination are sadly inadequate," 5 and the courts should not be
analyzing quality of life at all without these guidelines.116 On the
other hand, if we assume Baby Doe is representative of those in-
fants who are not to receive protection under the neglect law, those
statutes should specifically grant an exception so that parents, doc-
tors, and hospitals will not risk liability under that law.
The judicial tendency to look beyond statutory language to
"quality of life"1 17 or "balancing interests 11 8 tests seems to be
gaining approval from commentators in both the legal and medical
arenas.n19 This trend is disquieting, not only because the tests en-
dorsed may be applied with broad judicial discretion, but also be-
cause those tests permit rather arbitrary labelling of a human
being's worth. Life is placed on a continuum, ranging from least
human/most defective 20 to most human/least defective, and the
114. The court noted: 'There is a hint in this proceeding of a philosophy that new-
born, 'hopeless' lives should be permitted to expire without an effort to save
those lives. Fortunately, the medical evidence here is such that we do not
confront a 'hopeless' life." In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 702, 41 N.Y.S.2d 965,
968 (Sup. Ct. 1979). Treated, the child would probably lead a paralyzed inva-
lid life, but might someday walk with braces and have normal intelligence:
'This is not a case in which a court is asked to preserve an existence which
cannot be a life." Id. at 701, 41 N.Y.S.2d at 968. Judge Baker even distin-
guished Cicero (compared to Baby Doe) as a case where the prognosis was
for a relatively normal life. Judge Baker Letter, supra note 24, at 2.
115. See supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
116. There are some suggested alternatives to the present legislation to provide
these guidelines. See infra notes 242-54 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 69.
118. See Comment, supra note 62, at 786.
119. See Duff & Campbell, Moral & Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery,
289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973); Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at
Risk On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L. J. 645 (1977);
Shaw, Genetically Defective Children: Emerging Legal Considerations, 3 Am.
J. LAw & MED. 333 (1977).
120. An ethicist recently wrote with candor.
Once the religious mumbo-jumbo surrounding the term "human"
has been stripped away, we may continue to see normal members of
our species as possessing greater capacities of rationality, self-con-
sciousness, communication, and so on, than members of any other
species; but we will not regard as sacrosanct the life of each and
every member of our species, no matter how limited its capacity for
intelligent or even conscious life may be. If we compare a severely
defective human infant with a nonhuman animal, a dog or a pig, for
example, we will often find the nonhuman to have superior capaci-
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baby's fate is determined accordingly. Admittedly, the commenta-
tors' views reflect what a portion of society is willing to accept, and
society itself may ultimately decide the issue. But lent such re-
spectable professional signatures, the continuum tests may be
even more frequently used now to define "adequate medical care,"
and the minimum degree of care in providing it. The inconsistency
in application is striking. For the Cicero and Houle children, ade-
quate medical care was corrective surgery. For Baby Doe, ade-
quate medical care was nothing more than round-the-clock private
duty nurses and doctor's orders for whatever pain medication was
necessary.121 "Adequate medical care" for Baby Doe did not de-
mand corrective surgery to enable him to take nourishment.122
b. Enforcement
Problems of enforcement raise yet another difficulty in bringing
an action to intervene under child neglect law. There seem to be at
least two explanations. First, withholding treatment from
newborns is extremely difficult to uncover.123 Doctors and parents
work together and, regardless of their motivations and interests, if
they mutually agree on a course of treatment, the neglect may go
undetected unless someone outside that confidential doctor-pa-
tient-parent entity objects.124 The fact that it was not until 1973
that the medical profession first openly acknowledged the rela-
tively widespread practice of nontreatment indicates that society
had been largely ignorant of the practice until then.125
ties, both actual and potential, for rationality, self-consciousness,
communication, and anything else that can plausibly be considered
morally significant. Only the fact that the defective infant is a mem-
ber of the species Homo sapiens leads it to be treated differently
from the dog or pig. Species membership alone, however, is not mor-
ally relevant.
Singer, Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life?, 72 PEDIATRICS 28, 29 (1983).
121. In re Baby Doe, No. JV8204-038A (Ind. Juv. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 13, 1982)
(Finding 9).
122. The new "Baby Doe regulations" promise that this situation need never be
repeated. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,630, 1,657 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R
§ 84.55).
123. See Ellis, supra note 46, at 398-99.
124. See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children-A Search for
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 1028-30 (1975).
125. See Duff & Campbell, supra note 119. Admittedly, withholding treatment had
probably been a clandestine form of medical practice to any real extent for
only a relatively short period of time before this revelation. Until medicine
became sophisticated enough to be able to save certain defective newborns,
there was obviously no dilemma involved in deciding whether to treat. If so-
ciety becomes more accepting of passive euthanasia, doctors and parents
may be more likely to come to a nontreatment decision now than they would
have been 20 years ago when it was perhaps morally unthinkable. For exam-
ple, a 1975 survey of pediatricians revealed that only 17 percent of them would
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Of course, this discovery problem may not substantially differ
from any other child neglect situation, since child neglect is a
somewhat secreted family phenomenon.126 Yet a neglected child
of school age might have a better chance of getting help from
teachers, social workers, neighbors and anyone else in the commu-
nity who has an opportunity to see him.12 7 The exposure is drasti-
cally reduced in the defective newborn's case. Further, the
hospital community in which the child is born may be more toler-
ant of the practice of withholding medical treatment than the com-
munity at large might be of a practice of starving or battering an
older child.128 One safeguard some states employ is a child neglect
do everything possible to save an infant like Baby Doe (Down's Syndrome
with life-threatening intestinal obstruction); if the parents agreed with the
doctor's decision, and no legal sanctions would ensue, 61 percent of the pedia-
tricians polled would not have performed the lifesaving surgery. PRESmENT'S
Comm'N REP. supra note 4, at 208 (citing Treating the Defective Newborn A
Survey of Physician's Attitudes, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 2 (1976)). Another
study found 51 percent of the pediatricians surveyed in Massachusetts would
not have recommended surgery for such a child. Id. (citing Todres, Krane,
Howell, & Shannon, Pediatricians'Attitudes Affecting Decisionmaking in De-
fective Newborns, 60 PEDIATRICS 197 (1977)). See also Collester, supra note 6,
at 304-05 n.3 (reporting that in surveying physicians' attitudes regarding the
Karen Quinlan controversy, a medical magazine discovered that 86 percent of
the responding physicians had been confronted with whether to continue
treating a "vegetative" patient, and 75 percent believed such patient should
not be kept alive). These statistics certainly suggest that cases like Baby Doe
may occur with greater frequency than we realize. See 49 Fed. Reg. 1,645
(1984). But see the finding of the President's Commission which states that
"despite reports of occasional cases in which seriously erroneous decisions
about the treatment of newborns were carried out, such events appear to be
very rare," and are perhaps "inevitable in a society that treasures personal
and familial autonomy." PRESmENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 209 & n.51
and accompanying text. Professor Smith believes that the "Baby Doe regs"
were insufficiently based on "only four" documented cases of "discrimina-
tory" denial. Smith, supra note 47, at 718 n.57. DHHS points out that "there is
no requirement in law or policy to prove the magnitude of illegality before
establishing basic mechanisms [to enforce] a clearly applicable statute." 49
Fed. Reg. 1,645 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.55). Regardless of the
frequency or rarity, or of the medical profession's attitude, the judiciary may
remain uncomfortable with the practice. Early in the nontreatment contro-
versy, a court remarked: "There is a strident cry in America to terminate the
lives of other people-deemed physically or mentally defective .... Assur-
edly, one test of a civilization is its concern with the survival of the 'unfit-
test'. .. ." In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 757, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 787 (1974).
126. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws-Some Legislative History, 34 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 42 (1966); Note, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66
COLu M. L. REV. 697 (1966).
127. All 50 states now have compulsory reporting statutes.
128. It has been suggested that doctors sometimes employ the practice of not in-
forming parents of a severely defective child that there are any treatment
options-either by calling the situation hopeless, or by simply telling the par-
ents the child was stillborn. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 46, at 398. The national
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telephone "hotline."129 Anyone who suspects neglect may phone
the appropriate community department or law enforcement
agency, and an investigation or prosecution will then ensue. The
Reagan administration recently failed in an attempt to establish a
nationwide hotline specifically for the protection of Baby Doe in-
fants,130 but another hotline, in a somewhat less conspicuous form,
is now mandated by a new regulation. 13 1
A second problem with neglect law enforcement involves a hes-
itation to hold parents morally blameworthy. The few states that
have criminal as well as civil child neglect laws132 have never initi-
ated a criminal prosecution for withholding medical care from a
defective infant.133 When a child neglect law is invoked to protect
attention drawn to two cases at Johns Hopkins in the early 1970's indicated
that parents do make nontreatment decisions about children like Baby Doe
(afflicted with mongolism and life-threatening, surgically correctable intesti-
nal trouble), and neither the doctors nor the courts supervent these deci-
sions. Id. at 399-400. But see Brown & Truitt, supra note 75, at 631 (indicating
that often persons inside the health care setting will notify the "authorities"
of a nontreatment decision).
129. Nebraska provides for such a "hotline" by statute, NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-711
(Cum. Supp. 1979), and it is designed to protect both children and handi-
capped persons: "When any physician, medical institution, nurse ... or any
other person has reasonable cause to believe that a child or an incompetent
or disabled person has been subject to ... neglect, he or she shall report
such incident.., on the toll-free number." Id. (emphasis added).
130. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.61). The rule required
all hospitals receiving federal funds to post a notice, informing whomever
may be concerned of the policy of non-discrimination against the handi-
capped, in areas where care is provided to infants and handicapped persons.
The notice provided a contact point at the DHHS for reporting violations via
toll-free telephone. In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F.
Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983), the court struck down the regulation as arbitrary and
capricious, in that there was no attempt by the government to investigate the
appropriateness of nontreatment decisions, and no attempt to regulate its
disruptive effects on the health care situation. Still, there are reports that the
hotline system had been effective; it surfaced 33 accusations of improper
care, 11 of which were investigated by a government team of doctors and civil
rights personnel. Three handicapped newborns were apparently saved by
new medical techniques as the result of the attention drawn to them through
the hotline. See Walis, The Stormy Legacy of Baby Doe, TImE, Sept. 26, 1983,
at 58. Some 49 reports were investigated as of Dec. 1, 1983. Note that the
federal hotline rule was backed by handicapped discrimination regulations
and not by child neglect law. The hotline is not a brand-new method of un-
covering nontreatment decisions. At least one child with Down's Syndrome
and a gastrointestinal defect was saved when an anonymous report was made
to a Detroit, Mich. newspaper regarding the child's condition. See Brown &
Truitt, supra note 75, at 632.
131. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1984).
132. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 31, at 14, 15, & 63, for a survey of the
types of statutes and the penalties imposed.
133. See Mueller & Phoenix, A Dilemma for the Legal and Medical Professions Eu-
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a defective newborn, it is usually, as in Baby Doe and Cicero, sim-
ply a vehicle to obtain an order for treatment, or for a guardian
who may consent to treatment. It is not used as a weapon to penal-
ize the parents. Both out of compassion for the plight of par-
ents,134 and with great deference to family autonomy,135 many
courts that eventually find neglect may find it rather reluctantly.136
B. Handicapped Discrimination
"Had that baby been normal," remarked a Baby Doe editorial,
"his death by starvation would have been a public concern. But
because he had been inadvertently robbed of perfection, he was
deliberately robbed of life. His flaws somehow cancelled out his
rights."137 Perhaps due to the perceived failure of neglect stat-
utes, 3 8 or to the inapplicability and ineffectiveness of other sanc-
tions,139 Baby Doe and subsequent nontreatment cases are being
attacked as a form of discrimination against the handicapped. 40
An early case declared: "A person of 'unsound mind'--an idiot,
thanasia and the Defective Newborn, 22 ST. Lotus U.L.J. 501, 504 (1979); Rob-
ertson, supra note 6, at 243; Comment, supra note 69, at 710.
134. One commentator has observed.
Indeed, no sensitive person can fail to sympathize with the plight
of the parents, or blithely pass judgment on the choice they make.
After months of expectancy, they are informed that the newborn in-
fant has serious mental and physical defects and will never know a
normal existence. The shock of learning that one's child is defective
overwhelms parents with grief, guilt, personal blame, and often hope-
lessness. They are suddenly confronted with an uncertain future of
financial and psychological hardship, with potentially devastating ef-
fects on their marriage, family, and personal aspirations. If asked to
approve a medical or surgical procedure necessary to keep the child
alive, it is perhaps understandable that the parents view a life capa-
ble only of minimal interaction and development as the greater evil
and refuse to provide consent.
Robertson, supra note 6, at 215. See also PRxsmmEi's COB 'N REP., supra
note 4, at 210-211.
135. See infra note 187. See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP. supra note 4, at 212,
nn.62-63. Some authorities wish to treat parental autonomy as a fundamental
constitutional right to be infringed only upon a showing of compelling state
interest (the "strict scrutiny" test). See Note, supra note 27, at 1387. Parental
autonomy has been viewed by the courts in past years as both a "sacred"
natural right, see In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942), and as a
property interest, the subject of which "transcends property." Denton v.
James, 107 Kan. 729, 735, 193 P. 307, 310 (1920).
136. It has been suggested that neglect laws really don't operate to help the child,
but exist primarily to punish the parent. Wald, supra note 124, at 1037. In a
Baby Doe situation, however, punishing the parents is probably undesirable.
137. N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1982, at A22, col. 1.
138. See supra notes 103-22 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
140. Wallis, supra note 131, at 58; The Wash. Post, May 19, 1982, at A21, cols. 4-6.
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for example, is to all intellectual purposes, dead .... -141 Al-
though society has become more enlightened about mental retar-
dation since then,142 the mentally retarded person is still unable in
many cases to make his or her own treatment decisions. The men-
tally handicapped individual is no longer considered intellectually
dead, but nonetheless may require someone else to make a judg-
ment about his medical care. The doctrine of "substituted judg-
ment," which first appeared in a case involving the administration
of the estate of an incompetent,143 originally called for a court to
"don the mental mantle of the incompetent." 4 4 While not couched
specifically in terms of handicapped discrimination, several cases
deal with the handicapped, specifically the mentally retarded, and
substituted judgment with respect to medical treatment deci-
sions. 45 Admittedly, there is a distinction between physically dis-
abled adults who are capable of making their own decisions, and
mentally disabled adults who are deemed incompetent to judge for
themselves, and require a surrogate. This distinction brings the
case of an incompetent adult, regardless of the type or degree of
disability, very close to that of the defective infant: both must sur-
render what may be a life or death decision to someone else.146
Judicial handling of an incompetent's medical decision, regard-
less of the analysis purportedly followed, can be unpredictable,
since it is often not clear which standard a court adopts and how
that court applies the immediate facts to the standard. Uniform,
widely-embraced guidelines for the courts could reduce the inci-
dence of strained and inconsistent results in all but the most diffi-
cult cases. The post-Baby Doe demand for recognition of the rights
141. Jenkins v. Jenkins' Heirs, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 102, 104 (1834).
142. See R. BURGDORF, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS 46-52 (1980).
143. See ex parte Whitbread in re Hinde, a lunatic, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816).
144. See, e.g., In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545,241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Cf. Strange v. Powers, 358 Mass. 126, 136, 260 N.E.2d 704, 711 (1970).
145. See infra notes 259-80 and accompanying text.
146. For the handicapped person, the situation need not, of course be life or death,
but may involve surrendering certain important rights to the decisionmaker.
See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding the constitutionality of a
statute that permitted an involuntary sterilization of mentally handicapped
persons); In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171, reh. denied 183 Neb. 243,
159 N.W.2d 566 (1968), prob. juris noted sub nom. Cavitt v. Nebraska, 393 U.S.
1978, vacated as moot, 396 U.S. 996 (1969). Cavitt was the only decision to rely
on Buck in upholding an involuntary sterilization of incompetents statute,
and only on a three-judge majority. Cavitt made sterilization mandatory for
the release of a mentally retarded woman from a state institution, seeing the
"option" as hers. It was in Buck that Justice Holmes declared: "It is better
for all the world, if instead of waiting ... to let them starve for their imbecil-
ity, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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of defective newborns under already existing federal law may be a
welcome step in that direction.
1. The Attempt at Formal Federal Regulation
a. Section 504
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimi-
nation, by any program or activity directly receiving federal funds,
against any "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" ex-
cluded, discriminated against, or denied benefits "solely by reason
of his handicap."' 4 7 Whether physically disabled, mentally re-
tarded, or suffering both physical and mental disabilities, it is clear
that defective newborn infants fall under the statutory definition of
"handicapped,"4 8 and under most commonly accepted definitions,
as well.149 Undoubtedly, Baby Doe should have been protected by
section 504: "solely by reason of his handicap" (Down's Syn-
drome), he was excluded from and denied the benefits of medical
care that certainly would have been provided a non-retarded child.
Starving a baby of normal intelligence simply because of es-
ophageal fistula would never be tolerated:
[T]he standard... for letting die must be the same for the normal
child as for the defective child. If an operation.., is indicated to save the
life of a normal infant, it is also the indicated treatment of a mongoloid
infant. The latter is certainly not dying because of Down's Syndrome.
Like any other child with [an] obstruction in its intestinal tract, it will
starve to death unless an operation is performed... to permit normal
feeding.'
5 0
If, indeed, the standard is the same in our society for providing
care to the defective infant as it is for the normal infant, then the
standard was completely ignored in Baby Doe, was very nearly cir-
cumvented in Houle, and may soon be defeated again.'15
147. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (B) (1982) defines a "handicapped individual" as one who
"(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more major life activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is re-
garded as having such an impairment."
149. The general definition of "handicap" is "a disadvantage that makes achieve-
ment unusually difficult." R. BURGDORF, supra note 142, at 3. The Burgdorf
text provides an exhaustive survey of various definitions of "handicap," the
etymological analysis of the word, and the impact connotations of the label
"handicap" have had on those afflicted. See also State v. Turner, 3 Ohio App.
2d 5, 7, 209 N.E.2d 475, 477 (1965).
150. P. RAMSEY, ETmcs AT THE EDGES OF IAFE 192-93 (1978).
151. On October 11, 1983, Infant Jane Doe was born at Stony Brook Hospital, N.Y.,
with spina bifida and related complications. Her parents refused consent to
surgery that would extend and improve her life, pursuant to a physician's
nontreatment option. A. Lawrence Washburn, a Vermont attorney, peti-
tioned a justice of the N.Y. Court of Appeals to order surgery. A guardian ad
litem was appointed. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d
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b. The 1984 "Baby Doe Regulations"
A new federal regulation went into effect early this year,
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), pursuant to section 504.152 "Procedures relating to health
care for the handicapped" is a thorough expansion of the section
504 philosophy specifically applied to handicapped newborns. The
final regulation arrived after one false start, loud protest from the
medical profession, and careful study of nearly 17,000 comments
from doctors, nurses, hospital administrators, advocates for the
disabled, and parents of the handicapped.153 Its future and longev-
ity are uncertain.154
The regulation requires that each "recipient health care pro-
vider" post an informational notice explaining the illegality of
handicapped discrimination and providing telephone numbers of
1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (N.Y. App. 1983), found that Washburn had failed to ob-
serve appropriate child protection procedures via the state's Family Court
Act. See supra notes 104-21 and accompanying text. The court clearly chas-
tised Washburn, finding his actions "unusual" and "offensive" attempts to
"displace parental responsibility." Id. at 209, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d
at 64.
The Infant Jane Doe decision, and its subsequent litigation, created new
public furor over nontreatment decisions, and raised new questions about
public policy in the area. Surprisingly, the same society that had condemned
Baby Doe's parents only 18 months earlier seemed later to have had a change
of heart. For the most part, the media portrayed the parents sympathetically,
as harassed by a meddling stranger who was trying to usurp parental omnis-
cience. The courts seemed to agree. The Weber court saw outside interven-
tion as an attempt to intrude "into the very heart of the family circle, there to
challenge the most private and precious responsibility vested in the parents
... and at the very least force the parents to incur not inconsiderable ex-
penses of litigation." Id. If the society wants to become involved, and wishes
to issue periodic statements on the matter, it seems inconsistent that the so-
ciety is so violently opposed to the efforts of Washburn, simply one of its
members.
The government appealed Weber after becoming involved on behalf of the
child, seeking to obtain medical records pursuant to federal regulation.
United States v. University Hosp. at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
See infra notes 152-62 and accompanying text. The court held against the gov-
ernment, finding no statutory authority for intervention, and essentially find-
ing the new regulations inapplicable. See supra note 19. See generally U.S.
News & World Rep., Jan. 16, 1984, at 63; Henthoff, A Case of Deformed Journal-
ism at 60 Minutes, Village Voice, Apr. 3, 1984, at 6; Henthoff, Come Sweet
Death and Judge Baby's Quality of Life, Village Voice, Mar. 27, 1984, at 6;
Henthoff, Troublemaking Babies and Pious Liberals, Village Voice, Jan. 3,
1984, at 8; Bird, U.S. Role in 'Baby Doe' Case Defended by Surgeon General
N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at B4, col. 2.
152. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.55).
153. Id.
154. See supra note 19.
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reporting agencies. 5 5 The regulation also requires that federally
funded state child protection agencies establish procedures using
their "full authority pursuant to state law to prevent instances of
unlawful medical neglect of handicapped infants." The procedures
must include reporting requirements, methods for immediate re-
view and on-site investigation, and provisions for obtaining court
orders. Cooperation with any ethics committee involved is en-
couraged, and a model Infant Care Review Committee is outlined.
Finally, the rule requires that child protective services report to
DHHS each case of "suspected unlawful medical neglect involving
the withholding, solely on the basis of present or anticipated phys-
ical or mental impairments, of treatment or nourishment from a
handicapped infant who, in spite of such impairments, will medi-
cally benefit from the treatment or nourishment." 5 6
Important, too, are the regulation's efforts to "narrow the gray
area," by explaining section 504's definition of "handicapped" in
the context of the newborn, and by specifying circumstances
under which certain conditions will be treated in every instance.
These clarifications will, it is hoped, sharply limit a doctor's discre-
tion, and, if the courts pay close attention, will reduce the confu-
sion the judiciary presently faces.
The DHHS reiterated its position that section 504 applies to
handicapped infants as well as adults:
If the handicapped person is able to benefit medically from the treat-
ment or service, in spite of the person's handicap, the individual is "other-
wise qualified" to receive that treatment or service, and it may not be
denied solely on the basis of the handicap.
Therefore, the analytical framework under the statute for applying sec-
tion 504 in the context of health care for handicapped infants is that medi-
cally beneficial treatment and services not be withheld from a
handicapped infant solely on the basis of the handicap.
1 5 7
This position is clearly in line with the already recognized substan-
tial benefit analysis in the common law.'5 8
The DHHS sought to clarify this stand because some comments
submitted on the proposed rule asserted that discrimination on
the basis of handicap does not go to the heart of the treatment is-
sue. Those comments argued that section 504 analysis is inapplica-
ble in most nontreatment cases, because the handicap and the
condition requiring treatment (upon which an allegation of dis-
crimination rests) are one and the same.15 9
The Department responded with two illustrations. Baby Doe is
155. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,651 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84-55).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
159. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,636-37 (1984).
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the "simple" case. There, the child has two distinct conditions, and
the handicapping condition (Down's Syndrome) is separate from
the surgically correctible difficulty. "[A] ssuming no other [contra-
indications]" the child with Down's Syndrome must be treated no
differently than the child without.160 The situation becomes more
complicated when the handicapping condition is the problem that
requires treatment: "In such a case the 'handicap' is the physical
or mental impairment the infant has or will have... after comple-
tion of the treatment under consideration." 16 1 If "reasonable medi-
cal judgment" indicates that the infant is not able to benefit from
the treatment, then it need not be extended.162 However, if the
treatment would be medically beneficial-likely to bring about the
intended result of avoiding certain serious consequences to non-
treatment-then failure to treat "because of anticipated impair-
ments in future life" offends section 504, as the nontreatment "is
because of the handicap and in spite of the infant's being qualified
to receive surgery."16 3
Notably absent is any definition of what is "reasonable medical
judgment" and what are "contraindications" to treatment. 64 Lest
any physicians fear super-policing of a newborn's medical progno-
sis, "[t] he statutory framework does not provide for, nor will the
Department engage in, second-guessing of reasonable medical
judgments regarding medically beneficial care."1 65 Asserting that
constitutional protection for infants does not interfere with bona
fide medical judgments,166 the Department nonetheless acknowl-
edges that "not every opinion expressed by a doctor automatically
qualifies as a reasonable medical judgment."'67
It is important to realize what the new regulation does not do.
First, it does not require that the informational notice be posted for
everyone to see, and this may affect opportunities to report non-
treatment violations. Many comments expressed concern that
hospital visitors who saw the notice would fear it meant that the
particular institution practiced poor patient care. 168 Thus, a small
notice need only be posted where medical professionals will see
160. Id. at 1,637 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.55).
161. Id. (emphasis in original).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1,630 (emphasis in original).
164. Although it should be noted that the judgment is limited to what would be
medically beneficial, as opposed to some other consideration.
165. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,630 (1984).
166. Id. (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
167. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,630 (1984). This comment specifically attacks the Baby Doe
decision as unreasonable; DHHS asserts there are sufficient due process pro-
tections built into the regulations for doctors and hospitals fearing their judg-
ments will be constantly scrutinized. Id. at 1,643.
168. Id. at 1,626.
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it.169
Second-and more significant-section 504 applies only to pro-
grams receiving federal financial aid. It does not apply to decisions
made by parents. Hospitals are not allowed to overrule even the
most discriminatory parental decision: they are simply forbidden
to effectuate it.170 A recipient hospital "may not blindly implement
improper and discriminatory" choices, but is now required to "re-
sort to the system provided by state law" by notifying proper au-
thorities, or seeking judicial review.17 1 Given the troublesome
possibilities, any weakness in these new regulations may be tried
and tested on this very aspect.1 7 2
2. Local Analysis
Some state statutes expressly address abuse and neglect of the
disabled,173 and the new rules now insist that every recipient child
protective services agency implement existing state law in their
procedures. A state statute prohibiting handicapped discrimina-
tion may have more bite than section 504. The state may, for exam-
ple, deem criminal any person's act of discrimination, and subject
such a person to criminal sanctions. The teeth in section 504 sim-
ply provide for withholding or withdrawing funds from a federally
funded entity.174 However, a nontreatment decision will not neces-
sarily trigger state sanctions. Finding discrimination is a prerequi-
site, and unless state law is narrowly and clearly drawn, a court
may avoid that finding as easily as it may already avoid a neglect
determination. A statute that defines handicapped abuse in terms
of depriving a disabled person of "necessary food ... or medical
care"1 75 is no stronger than a similar neglect statute.
Ultimately, then, the same interpretation and enforcement
problems that beset child neglect law in nontreatment decisions
will also plague disabled abuse law, and may render it somewhat
ineffective in the nontreatment anaysis.1 7 6 The new and ambi-
169. Id. at 1,625 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.55).
170. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,631 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.55).
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. Frankly, the new regulations may never reach that stage. See supra notes 19
& 151 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-708 (1979).
174. Thus, an entity is free to discriminate under federal law so long as it is willing
to operate without federal funding.
175. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-708 (Cur. Supp. 1982).
176. The Nebraska statute uses exactly the same language to protect the handi-
capped as it does to protect the neglected child: "A person commits abuse of
an incompetent or disabled person if he... causes or permits an incompe-
tent or disabled person to be: (a) Placed in a situation that endangers his life
or health; or ... (c) Deprived of necessary food, clothing, shelter, or
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tious federal guidelines require state procedures for implementa-
tion. In response we must insist on thorough, clear, and controlled
policy.
C. Law On The Periphery
While neglect and discrimination theories are most pertinent to
Baby Doe decisions, they do not complete a discussion of the con-
troversy. The law is the voice of our society, attacking the evils we
wish to be rid of, and protecting the values we hold dear. Society
announces itself in the particular through a single statute or hold-
ing, but speaks in the larger sense through entire statutory
schemes, or general judicial expressions of public order and moral-
ity. Thus any exploration of how we wish to deal with defective
babies invites other questions: how do we respond to killings, or to
the desires of children, or to life just before it is newborn?
1. Killing and Planning to Kill: Homicide and Conspiracy
It has been argued that those responsible for nontreatment de-
cisions may be charged with homicide.177 Homicide by omission,
that is, the death of another because of a failure to act,178 suggests
prosecution of those responsible for withholding medical care who
have an affirmative duty to provide it. Clearly, a parent is charged
with the duty to provide his or her minor child with necessary
medical care, and where a parent fails to obtain needed profes-
sional assistance, the child's resulting death will be homicide. The
attending physician may also be liable for homicide once he as-
sumes the legal obligation to treat the infant when the failure to
treat means death to the child,179 even though treatment is fore-
gone in accord with the parents' wishes.180 Some rather elaborate
theories assert parents' and doctors' affirmative duties to the de-
care .... ." NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-708 (Cum. Supp. 1982). Cf. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-707 (1979) (protection with respect to minor children).
177. See Robertson, supra note 6, at 217-18 & 224-25.
178. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 44, at 188-89. See also State v. Williams, 4
Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 (1971), where the parents of a 14-month-old boy
were guilty of manslaughter when the baby died of a toothache which had
turned into a serious infection. The parents' love for the child, their igno-
rance, and their fear that the child would be taken from them by the public
authorities was insufficient to reverse the manslaughter conviction. Compare
In re Green, 12 CRmME & DELINQ. 377 (Milwaukee County Ct. Wis. 1966) (see
supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Green), and In re
Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561 (1912) (see supra note 55 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Tuttendario).
179. Robertson, supra note 6, at 225.
180. 1&
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fective newborn.181 They remain, insofar as they could trigger lia-
bility for nontreatment, simply theories. To date, no court has
imposed criminal sanctions on a parent for refusing treatment to a
defective newborn,182 and Baby Doe suggests that physicians may
be easily relieved of liability so long as parents agree with the doc-
tor's medically recommended course of nontreatment.
Likewise, criminal conspiracy law implies that parents and doc-
tors acting in concert may be guilty of more than just murder or
manslaughter. Conspiracy involves an agreement to achieve an
unlawful objective, in this case, the death of a child, and often an
affirmative, overt act to evidence the intent to achieve that objec-
tive.'8 3 If conspiracy law were successfully applied to those mak-
ing nontreatment decisions, it would probably encompass all
nontreatment attempts-regardless of whether the child's death
resulted. Prosecution for conspiracy to withhold treatment from a
defective newborn has probably never been attempted.184 Per-
haps, as with neglect law, courts are simply reluctant to hold cul-
pable either parents who have made an anguished decision, or
doctors who have exercised their best medical judgment in a medi-
cally frustrating situation. This surely explains any lack of prose-
cution in cases where the court intervenes and orders treatment
over a nontreatment decision.
Baby Doe, however, suggests that there can be no prosecution
for homicide or conspiracy even where a court does not order
treatment. The Baby Doe court approved of, even encouraged, the
nontreatment decision, so long as both parties to the decision-the
doctor and the parent-agreed.18 Baby Doe thus implies that re-
gardless of our response to criminal killing, the essential factors in
homicide or conspiracy are not met in nontreatment decisions.
There is no unlawful act, or attempt to achieve an unlawful act,
upon which to base a conviction.186 This result may be inconsis-
tent with our general philosophy regarding death from criminal
omission. But this inconsistency is not terribly troubling, if consis-
tency demands we severely punish a mother and father who have
suffered too much already.
181. See supra note 179.
182. Comment, supra note 69, at 710.
183. W. LAFAVE & A. Scowr, supra note 44, at 453.
184. See Robertson, supra note 6, at 234-35.
185. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Ind. Cir. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 10, 1982).
But see 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1984), encouraging a 'resumption... in favor of
treatment." 49 Fed. Reg. 1,652 (1984).
186. See also Note, supra note 63, at 613-15.
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2. The Child's Best Interests: Borrowing the Custody
Standard
In choosing which parent should have custody of a child after
divorce, and in examining foster care and child neglect situations,
the law most commonly invokes the "child's best interests" test.187
This standard looks relatively simple on its face: it means that the
child's welfare is given priority over every other interest involved.
The child's-best-interests guide is surely consistent with the recog-
nized social aim of protecting the young and helpless, and it has
been adopted by courts to decide what degree of medical care chil-
dren should receive.188 It is logical, therefore, to extend the stan-
dard to those children born disabled:
At the point when a child is born, the focus has got to be only on the child
and its interests. And if the child is born with a handicapping condition,
but can live a life notwithstanding that condition, then its interests go in
only one direction-and that is living.1 8 9
Pure as the child's-best-interests test may seem, it is an unrelia-
ble standard when applied to defective newborns' treatment deci-
sions. It is "in many ways a fiction, because the child's [best]
interests depend on who is defining them .... ,"190 An infant's wel-
fare, much like the quality of his life, may be extremely vulnerable
to subjective, varying definition.
In applying this standard to a nontreatment controversy, courts
will generally assume one of two things: either an infant's interest
is always in life,191 or, absent that first assumption (but perhaps
not inconsistent with it), the parents are the ones who will most
successfully and accurately determine what the child's best inter-
ests are.192 To the extent that those two assumptions do not ulti-
187. Id. at 606. See Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925) (first articu-
lated the "child's best interests" standard); Foster, Adoption and Child Cus-
tody: Best Interests of the Child, 22 BuFFALo L. REv. 1, 3 (1972); Note, In the
Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents In Child Placement Pro-
ceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 446, 448-49 (1976).
188. The "Jehovah's Witness blood transfusion cases" provide excellent exam-
ples. See State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890
(1962); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
189. Herbert Hinkle, Director of the N. J. Div. of Advocacy for the Developmen-
tally Disabled, quoted in interface, Vol. 8, Nos. 4-5 (1983) (Newsletter of N.J.
Dev. Disabilities Council).
190. Note, supra note 63, at 606. See supra notes 82-84 & infra notes 220-30 and
accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 30, 337 A.2d 689, 693 (1967). ("It is
basic to the human condition to seek life and hold onto it however heavily
burdened").
192. Parental autonomy enjoys some powerful constitutional support. Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right to choose child's religious upbringing);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to choose child's educa-
tion); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to raise a child). There is
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mately lead to the same conclusion, Baby Doe may signify a
growing departure away from the first,193 and an increasing reaffir-
mation of the second.194
The child's-best-interests standard resembles the concept of in-
formed consent through substituted judgment regarding the treat-
ment decision.195 Each of these decision methods is unavoidably
subjective to some degree. The academic distinction between the
two is that the child's best interests analysis seeks to determine
what is best for the defective newborn from a societal, medical, ju-
dicial, or parental standpoint, and the substituted judgment doc-
trine attempts to place the decisionmaker in the position of the
handicapped newborn. Ultimately, however, any distinction is
simply conceptual, and becomes blurred with practical application:
"beyond their enforceable rights to medical treatment, infants also
may have interests in merely staying alive, or in leading as full,
rich, and rewarding lives as possible. Invariably, the extent of
these interests in any particular infant varies with the perspective
of whoever is attempting to evaluate them."196
The test is unworkable because the decisionmaker's perspec-
tive changes what a child's best interests are from case to case.
Moreover, this perspective is clouded by competing interests-
something of a limitation, of course: "Parents may be free to become martyrs
themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances,
to make martyrs of their children. . . ." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
170 (1944). It has been suggested that parental autonomy be treated as a fun-
damental right. See generally Note, supra note 27, at 1388.
193. At the base of every analysis of defective newborn nontreatment is the as-
sumption that, at some point, the child's interest in life gives way to an inter-
est in death. See Clarke, supra note 75, at 823; Comment, supra note 62, at 795.
See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
Quinlan is often cited as the "right to die" case. See supra notes 72-76 and
accompanying text. Baby Doe's presiding judge assumes this. There is rea-
son to believe that Baby Doe's parents in good faith felt that their child had a
right to die and that the exercise of this right was in his best interests (he
was given last rites and baptized). The court may have agreed, since peti-
tions to adopt the child were not heard. In re Baby Doe, No. JV8204-038A
(Ind. Juv. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 13, 1982). Judge Baker stated: "It is a
harsh view that no life is preferable to life," Judge Baker Letter, supra note
24, at 2, but that is precisely the conclusion drawn. Compare the wrongful life
decisions. See Shaw, supra note 119, at 338.
194. Baby Doe is clearly an example of the emphasis on parental autonomy, for it
was the right to privacy in nontreatment decisionmaking that the court en-
dorsed. See supra notes 27 & 92. As Judge Baker noted: 'To say that parents
are neglectful implies that the State or society knows what is best for the
child. In the 'Infant Doe' case, it could not be said that the parents were not
acting in the best interests of the child, even though other parents might have
acted differently." Judge Baker Letter, supra note 24, at 2.
195. See infra notes 259-67 and accompanying text.
196. Longino, supra note 2, at 386.
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usually those of the parents-in avoiding the marital stress, the
difficulties with siblings, the immense financial burdens, and the
continuous grief that a defective child can bring to a family.197
These competing interests may weigh heavily against a parent's
duty to care for the child. The Baby Doe case did not speak di-
rectly to these issues, but one judge asserted "it could not be said
that the parents were not acting in the best interests of the child,
even though other parents might have acted differently."' 9 8 It is
difficult to imagine a decision which would permit any child's life
to depend merely upon the financial, familial or emotional burdens
of the persons legally charged with the duty to protect that life. 199
However, the fact that competing interests are given any recogni-
tion at all suggests that courts extend them some consideration
and validity when parents urge nontreatment.200
3. Protecting the Nearly-Born: Postviability Abortion
Regulation
A parental decision to withhold treatment from a disabled child
closely resembles a mother's decision to abort a viable unborn
child. Both controversies attempt to resolve privacy rights of
choice, respecting personal or parental autonomy, with society's
interest in protecting human life. Arguably, there is but a very fine
line between the life interest of a nearly-born and a newborn. The
decisionmaker's automony interests are similar, too: they include
the right to beget children or to avoid the burdens of parenthood,
197. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 403 (D.D.C.
1983). Competing interests are increasingly meriting serious consideration.
It is suggested that the impact a defective child would have on the family
unit, the marriage, sibling coping, and economic hardship, all deserve consid-
eration. See Longino, supra note 6, at 386. Perhaps this is consistent with a
state interest in preserving the family unit. The responses vary. Id- Eco-
nomic considerations are troublesome, especially since the "healthier" a
handicapped person may be, the longer he is likely to survive, even in his
defective state, and therefore the more expensive his maintenance may be.
On the other hand, the more seriously defective life may only last an ex-
tremely short period of time, and cost much less to care for (even if on a
machine). From a purely financial standpoint, it is in the best interests of the
one paying the bills to protect the seriously defective infant over the less sick,
less defective one.
The more weight afforded competing interests, perhaps the nearer we
reach risking other, broader nontreatment decisions with less sensitivity and
concern for the individual who stands to be most directly and drastically
affected.
198. Judge Baker Letter, supra note 24, at 2.
199. This is particularly true when the parents may relinquish custody. While not
always possible, in Baby Doe there were couples willing to adopt the child.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1982, at A6, col. 1.
200. See supra notes 197 & 221-25 and accompanying text.
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and to decide when and how to raise a family.20 Finally, some of
the same concerns that permit a postviability abortion choice also
disturb a clear and unprejudiced treatment choice: emotional or
family, strain, financial devastation, and mental well-being of the
decisionmaker. 202
The landmark abortion case, Roe v. Wade,203 established that a
prospective mother has a fundamental right to make her own deci-
sion, with proper medical advice, on whether to have an abor-
tion.20 4 The state acquires a compelling interest in the
"potentiality of human life" only during that period of pregnancy
"subsequent to viability."2 05 Nearly half of the states presently
regulate postviability abortions, and most of these regulations pro-
hibit the abortion unless it is to protect the mother's life or
health.206
Roe defines a viable fetus as one "potentially able to live
outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid,"207 and many
states define viability in exactly those words.208 If a "viable" fetus
is worthy of the state's protection, it should not follow that a child
born alive and in need of treatment-now considered a '"person"
worthy of the constitutional protection that "personhood" re-
quires-may be denied the same consideration for artificial sup-
port. Baby Doe involved such a child, if corrective surgery may be
considered "artificial aid."209 Yet the "course of nontreatment"
adopted runs contrary to postviability abortion policy.
Notably, both nontreatment and abortion decisions afford great
weight to medical judgment. A state attempting to protect its in-
terest in '"potential" life2 10 must account for Supreme Court rul-
201. See supra note 27.
202. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). A third trimester abortion may be per-
formed to save the life or health of the mother. The Court defined "health"
broadly to include psychological as well as physical well-being, in light of all
the circumstances. Id. at 191-92.
203. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
204. Id. at 153.
205. Id. at 163.
206. For a survey of states which regulate postviability abortions, and their
prohibitions, see Wood & Hawkins, State Regulation of Late Abortions & the
Physician's Duty of Care to the Viable Fetus, 45 Mo. L. REV. 394, 415, nn.139-41
(1980).
207. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
208. See Wood & Hawkins, supra note 205, at 405. See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 387 (1979) (viability determination requirement of § 5, Pa. Abortion
Control Act, void for vagueness).
209. Compare the Quinlan situation, see supra notes 72-64 and accompanying text,
with that in Houle, see supra notes 87-100.
210. "Potential" life is the Court's terminology. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163
(1973). This should be compared with Professor Noonan's analysis in J. Noo-
NAN, A PRiVATE CHOICE 147 (1979).
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ings that the viability determination is a medical matter left to the
judgment of the attending physician.211 These cases emphasize
the "seemingly absolute role of the physician" in determining via-
bility.212 This makes regulation of the doctor's decision virtually
impossible; as a result the state cannot "vindicate its compelling
interest in the life of the fetus after viability."213 Perhaps, then, the
doctor's subjective determination of viability offers only "scant"
protection of a state interest.2 14
Most states that regulate postviability abortions usually protect
the fetus delivered alive by declaring it to have the same rights as
a live fetus intended to be born and not aborted.215 Several of
those states require that a physician planning to perform a third
trimester 2 16 abortion consult one or two other doctors to certify
that the operation is necessary to preserve the life and health of
the mother.2 17 Similar requirements imposed in nontreatment sit-
uations would better serve the compelling state interest in protect-
ing life, and might help guard against extreme discretion on the
part of the attending physician.21 8 The Baby Doe court did not
211. See Wood & Hawkins, supra note 206, at 405. See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979).
212. See Wood & Hawkins, supra note 206, at 405. See also Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982) (courts must show appropriate deference to profes-
sional determinations).
213. Wood & Hawkins, supra note 206, at 405.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 419. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-331 (1979) directs that: "All reasonable steps,
in accord with the sound medical judgment of the attending physician, shall
be employed in the treatment of any child aborted alive with any chance of
survival."
216. The Court has noted that: "Viability is usually at about seven months (28
weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
160 (1973).
217. See Wood & Hawkins, supra note 206, at 416. A federal court in Illinois struck
down such a statute in Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill.), appeal
dismissed, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), when it found no direct relationship between the
state's interest in preserving maternal and fetal health, and the number of
doctors participating in the decision. Still, it may be argued that the addi-
tional safeguard is desirable with a live birth.
218. Arguably, such a requirement may not have saved Baby Doe, since indica-
tions are that two doctors recommended corrective surgery, but one physi-
cian, "representing the concurring opinions of himself" and two other
doctors, recommended nontreatment. See In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A
(Ind. Cir. Ct. Monroe County Apr. 10, 1982) (Declaratory Judgment). How-
ever, the Baby Doe court implies that it would have upheld the parents' deci-
sion so long as a "medically recommended treatment" mode was followed.
Id. See In re Green, 12 CanIE & DELINQ. 377 (Milwaukee County Ct. Wis.
1966). In Green, the mother's decision to refuse her son blood transfusions
was upheld partly "because of medical advice she has had from other physi-
cians, and because doctors cannot assure her that it [treatment] will be effec-
tive in saving the life of the child or be of substantial benefit to him." Id at
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speak directly to the quantity of medical opinion necessary to de-
termine withholding treatment. The court refused to intervene,
however, partly because the Doe parents were following a medical
recommendation. It may, therefore, be safe to assume that no
more than one authoritative medical recommendation is needed
for the nontreatment decision to be non-reviewable. 2 19
If Baby Doe reflects good social policy, then the decision surely
suggests inconsistency in our social conscience. We provide a
medical safeguard where the life is only "potential," and in fact the
intent is to successfully abort, yet the fetus is not entitled to full
constitutional protection. Why then do we not require a similar
medical safeguard, the "second opinion," to protect a live birth, es-
tablished as human life, and conferred with personhood? Cer-
tainly, no postviability abortion statute allows a lower standard of
care for the live-born fetus who also happens to be handicapped.
And certainly, the mother's competing interest in her right to pri-
vacy in decisionmaking is at least as strong (if not stronger) with
respect to an abortion decision as it is in a nontreatment
decision.220
III. DIRECTIONS THE LAW MAY SEEK
A. Chinks In The Doctor-Parent Armor
If there is no other rule to be gleaned from Baby Doe, the deci-
sion at least stands for the proposition that a court will not over-
turn a nontreatment decision as long as two requirements are met:
first, the parents must be exercising a right to privacy, so that fam-
ily autonomy vindicates the decision to withhold medical care; sec-
ond, the decision must be based on a medical recommendation.
While the decisions and judgments of both parties-doctor and
parent-are probably necessary under most circumstances for the
nontreatment conclusion, many question whether they are also
sufficient.
In our society, parents are expected to be advocates for the
child, substitute decisionmakers who grant consent and who are
supposed to look out for the child's best interests. Surely the con-
379-80. While it seems that many doctors are offended by an attempt to inter-
fere with their decisionmaking and treatment, others might find a relief from
such heavy decisionmaking responsibility welcome.
219. See supra notes 5 & 7 and accompanying text. See also 49 Fed. Reg. 1,630
(1984) (DHHS will not second guess reasonable medical judgments regarding
medically beneficial care).
220. Some suggest that a defective newborn's potential for growth and develop-
ment may be so limited that it cannot be considered a "person" for purposes
of constitutional protection. Life alone, therefore, may not be a sufficient req-
uisite for personhood. See Comment, supra note 62, at 788.
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clusion to withhold or withdraw treatment is in most cases a pain-
ful and compassionate one to reach: "Parents are usually present,
concerned, willing to become informed, and cognizant of the values
of the culture in which the child will be raised. They can be ex-
pected to try to make decisions that advance the newborn's best
interests." 221 However, not all parents faced with treatment op-
tions are going to make the best choice.222 The interests of the
parents and other family members compete with the child's, and
make dispassionate judgment extremely difficult.223
It may be impossible for parents who waited anxiously for the
birth of their child to accept the child's deformity without anxiety,
guilt, or bitterness. 224 A decision to do everything possible to save
the child, made in a moment of benevolence when a quick re-
sponse to life or death demanded, may be later viewed as a mis-
take when the child must undergo yet another surgery in the
course of ordinary treatment which may not appreciably improve
the quality of life prognosis. Conversely, a decision to withhold
treatment may haunt parents who might later wonder if they re-
acted immorally and too hastily. Finally, it may be much more dif-
ficult to make heartfelt parental decisions for a newborn than for
an older child. The parent-child bond, established and strength-
ened over time and experience, through which the parent nurtures
and defends the child, may be weakest at birth.225
221. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 209. One parent asserted:
I am very uncomfortable with the doctor assuming that if there are
two equal things, he will decide and take the responsibility ...
[W] hen [I became] a parent... I had assumed there would be hard
decisions to make, and some of them were harder than I anticipated.
But nonetheless, I felt that was a responsibility I took for myself.
And I don't want to turn it over to somebody who is going to spare me
that.
Id. at 211. See 49 Fed. Reg. 1,631 (1984) (National Association of Children's
Hospitals argued parents' determinations of their child's best interests "are
theirs to make, a right and responsibility assigned to them universally by
state statute."). Id. at 1,631.
222. See, e.g., In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App.3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980). Phillip B. involved a Down's Syndrome child whose
parents institutionalized him at birth, and later refused consent to heart sur-
gery that would extend his life beyond the projected twenty years. His condi-
tion without surgery would deteriorate from "mildly retarded" and able to
perform certain tasks, to bedridden. Phillip's parents, however, felt that he
would be better off dead than alive. See Longino, supra note 2, at 388 (citing
trial transcript). Surgery was not deemed lifesaving. A foster couple suc-
cessfully adopted him after a years-long court battle, and he now leads a full
life.
223. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
224. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 210, 215-16.
225. The "parental bond" phenomenon has received some judicial recognition.
See Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983) (examining the extent to which
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Doctors, too, may be plagued with difficulty in advising the par-
ents.226 They feel that they must assume some of the burden of
decisionmaking to alleviate the parents' suffering, especially since
they are expected to move under the aegis of Hippocrates, and act
as the child's advocate.227 Undoubtedly, doctors are at least par-
tially motivated by what experience has shown to be painful or fu-
tile or inhumane. Doctors are medical technicians able to
announce what ticks and what does not; they are also ethical, care-
ful, often religious, human beings.
But, as is the case with parents, not all doctors can be expected
to offer the best evaluation all of the time. Baby Doe certainly
demonstrates that doctors can and will disagree on what medical
options are appropriately posed to the parents. 228 It has been as-
serted that even physicians remain quite ignorant about opportu-
nities and prospects for the mentally retarded.229 It has further
been suggested that occasionally a doctor will not present parents
with the entire range of choices available, either because the doc-
tor thinks the parents incapable of fully understanding the gravity
and complexity of the decision, or because the doctor fears liability
if the parents later regret the professionally recommended
option.230
B. Alternatives To Doctor-Parent Exclusivity
A medical authority asserts that the decision whether to treat
infants with birth defects should be borne exclusively by the doc-
tor and parents, and that "much latitude in decisionmaking should
be expected and tolerated. Otherwise, the rules of society or the
policies most convenient for medical technologists may become
the cruel masters of human beings instead of their servants." 231
Today, however, the rules of society, in their unrefined and con-
the natural biological unwed father's relationship with his illegitimate child
receives due process protection). See also Ellis, supra note 46, at 414 ("Pa-
rental-child bonding may not yet be complete, and the parental love assumed
by society to exist in other contexts may not yet have developed. Thus, other
considerations may prevail. A defective or deformed baby devastates paren-
tal expectations. A denial of treatment removes this unexpected and possi-
bly unwanted infant.") Cf. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,629 (1984) (testimonials from
parents).
226. This discussion is synthesized largely from the PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP.,
supra note 4, at 210.
227. See id.
228. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
229. The American Speech-Language-Hearing Association so reported to the
DHHS. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,650 (1984).
230. See PRESMENT'S COMe'N REP., supra note 4, at 211.
231. Duff & Campbell, supra note 119, at 894.
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
fused form, are "cruel masters," not only of those chancing a bad
decision, but of those human beings whose lives are at stake.
That being the case, so much decisionmaking latitude should
not be tolerated. Though the parent and doctor each try to ad-
vance the child's best interests, the well-recognized interest in
human life urges society itself to advocate for the child as well. 232
If our policy calls for new checks on the doctor-parent entity, we
must answer fairly and responsibly. Incomplete goals and unde-
fined guides do not ease the decisionmaker's burden. Federal reg-
ulation seems at this point to answer many of the issues. But in
frustrated response to this difficult situation, some further sugges-
tions have been put forth for social consideration.
1. Ethics Committees
One such alternative is an ethics committee, to advise and rule
in the treatment process. Quinlan suggested this procedural tool
for future nontreatment dilemma. That outline recommended that
once the attending physicians conclude that there is "no reason-
able possibility of ... ever emerging from [the] present comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient state,"233 and the guardian agrees
with the doctor's nontreatment recommendation, a hospital ethics
committee must concur before nontreatment is permissible.
Variations on the Quinlan framework carry the procedure sev-
eral steps further. Those models recommend that if a defective
newborn requires medical attention, and the parents refuse con-
sent, treatment will not be administered if all of the treating physi-
cians and the ethics committee concur. If, however, either the
committee or any member of the medical staff favors treatment, a
panel will hear the issue, with power to appoint guardians ad litem,
commence judicial action, and expedite a decision.234 Federal reg-
ulations recommend adherence to section 504 standards, and sug-
gest a model committee. 235 Another guide for nontreatment is
"clear and convincing evidence that such withholding of treatment
is in the patient's best interest, considering the probability of re-
covery with the proposed treatment, the potential side effects of
232. Public outcry over some nontreatment decisions may indicate a great willing-
ness to involve society in the decisionmaking.
233. In re Quinlan 70 N.J. 10, 55, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (1976).
234. See Shapiro, Medical Treatment of Defective Newborns: An Answer to the
'Baby Doe' Dilemma, 20 IARv. J. ON LEGIS. 137, 151 (1983). See also 49 Fed.
Reg. 1,651 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.55).
235. The DHHS provides detailed guides for Infant Care Review Committees, rec-
ognizing them as potentially very valuable tools in the decision process. Due
to the fact that the committees are "largely untried," they are "not demon-
stratably effective enough to justify requirement" for some 7,000 hospitals na-
tionwide. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,624 (1984).
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the treatment, and the nature of the treatment.1236
Though this and similar standards may be broad and vague, 237
the ethics committee concept need not be abandoned. Ethics com-
mittees or review panels have been endorsed by commentators 238
and medical professionals.2 39 The best rationale for their involve-
ment is that they provide an additional perspective, one that dra-
matically reduces the subjectivity of the treatment decision, and
dilutes the considerations competing with the child's interests.
The panel should be comprised of qualified, well-informed repre-
sentatives of the community. It has been suggested, then, that
physicians (besides the attending physician), hospital administra-
tors, lawyers, advocates for the handicapped, and laypersons
would provide a balanced review. 240
Such reviewing bodies can be effective protections against rash
decisions or questionable medical advice. However, if an ethics
committee functions only as an advisory board, merely informing
doctor and parent of options and liabilities, it is a voiceless and
impotent representative-of both the child and the society that
wants to save hirn.241
2. Legislative Proposals
It may be asserted that ethics committees and panels do not
reflect the broad social consensus as well as the legislature might.
Committee decisions, even if dispositive, may mirror only local
community standards that will conceivably vary from place to
place. The legislature might be expected to articulate public policy
more completely, and thus the solution to the nontreatment di-
lemma-if, indeed, any solution is to be found-may call for legis-
lative guidelines.
Currently, few states have any legislative initiative affecting the
treatment of infants.242 "Because of the paucity of legislation on
236. Shapiro, supra note 234, at 151.
237. See supra notes 103-22 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 234, at 148-52.
239. The American Academy of Pediatrics' official policy was developed by their
Committee on Bioethics, assisted by the Committee on Fetus and Newborn,
Hospital Care, and Children with Handicaps. The AAP President asserts that
"a better remedy [than federal intervention] ... is the establishment in each
hospital of an internal review procedure whenever the decision to forego life-
sustaining therapy is being considered." Letter from James E. Strain, MD,
Pres., AAP, published in Treatment of Critically Ill Newborns, 72 PEDIATRICS
565 (1983).
240. See Shapiro, supra note 234, at 151-52.
241. Professor Smith favors ethics committees, but only as advisors leaving the
decision to the parents. See Smith, supra note 47, at 718.
242. See B. SALEs, D. PowELL & R. VANDRuziND, DIsABLED PERsONs AND THE LAw
90 (1982).
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
this topic and because of the clear inadequacies" in some of those
laws, a model statute for emergency medical care and treatment
for infants was developed.243 The Emergency Care statute "adopts
the philosophy that life-preserving care and treatment should be
provided on a nondiscriminatory basis to all infants regardless of
present or potential disability, and explicitly rejects the quality of
life and economic hardship rationales that have been advanced in
favor of non-treatment."244 The Department of Health and Human
Services also recently proposed a model Child Protection Act,245
which addresses a wide range of possible harms. The Act "seeks
to establish an effective state and local system for child protection
by providing those procedures necessary to safeguard the well-be-
ing and development of endangered children .... 246
It is noteworthy that each proposal recognizes the child's fam-
ily. The Child Protection Act generally expresses an intent to
"preserve and stabilize family life, whenever appropriate. '247 The
Emergency Care statute further develops that goal, providing fi-
nancial assistance and family counseling (mandatory only after
other means have failed). This statute attempts to maintain the
integrity of the family unit, rather than to usurp the traditional pa-
rental position. Only in one instance-when failure to provide
treatment will endanger the child's life-may treatment be pro-
vided without parental approval, and then "only to the extent nec-
essary to assure that the infant's life is preserved."248
The real test of these model statutes lies in their effectiveness
when applied to the nontreatment case. The Child Protection pro-
posal is broader in scope, and only generally prohibits the failure
to provide "food, clothing or shelter necessary for the child's
health or safety" and "any medical or nonmedical remedial health
care permitted or authorized under state law."249 Unfortunately,
the Act may not provide any more definite guidelines than present
neglect and abuse law, and may thus prove to be equally inade-
quate in light of existing interpretation and enforcement
difficulties.250
In contrast, the Infant Emergency Care statute deals carefully
with defective newborn treatment. Not only does this model make
a strong and specific commitment to ease family burdens, it also
identifies which children are definitely within its protective
243. Id.
244. Id. at 91.
245. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 478.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. B. SALES, D. PowE,. & R. VANDRuznD, supra note 242, at 91.
249. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 479.
250. See supra notes 103-22 and accompanying text.
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realm.25' Like the new federal regulations,252 the statute ad-
dresses only the infant care problem, and thoroughly defines its
goals in the statutory language and supplemental comments. Fi-
nally, the statute provides that "[a]ny physician who knowingly
fails to provide necessary medical care and treatment to an infant"
(as defined in the statute) may have his license revoked and be
subject to criminal liability.253 Parents who fail to comply with a
court order for treatment issued pursuant to the statute will be
held in contempt of court.254
C. The Role of the Court
While the debate continues with respect to what sorts of medi-
cal, ethical or legislative solutions are appropriate, the courts are,
at least for the time being, forced to play an active role in the non-
treatment controversy. Sometimes, the role is played reluctantly,
indeed:
[C]are by societal standards is the responsibility of the physician. The
morality and conscience of our society places this responsibility in the
hands of the physician. What justification is there to remove it from the
control of the medical profession and place it in the hands of the court?2 5 5
The justification, of course, is that our society may be unwilling to
surrender completely its "morality and conscience" to the control
of the medical profession. If the law articulates American con-
science, it seems entirely appropriate to place a judicial check on
certain individual judgments.
One court took a "dim view" of any shift in ultimate decision-
making away from the judiciary, favoring court intervention over
reliance on ethics committees and doctor-parent isolation.256The
court was not a "gratuitous encroachment" on the medical field,
but the body responsible for addressing the life or death question
of nontreatment. 257 The court's duty was to "detached but pas-
sionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which
the judicial branch of government was created."258
251. The model statute protects the "developmentally disabled," which envisions
covering "all conditions suggestive of later retardation" including Down's
Syndrome, spina bifida, and brain disorders. See B. SALEs, D. PoWELL & R.
VANDRuZIND, supra note 242 at 93.
252. See supra notes 152-72 and accompanying text.
253. B. SALEs, D. POWELL & R. VANDRUZND, supra note 242, at 97.
254. Id. at 98. For further consideration of the policy of legislative alternatives, see
Ellis, supra note 46, at 417-23.
255. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 44, 355 A.2d 647, 665 (1976) (quoting In re Quinlan, 137
N.J. Super. 227, 229, 348 A.2d 801, 818 (Ch. Div. 1975)).
256. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 758,
370 N.E.2d 417, 434 (1977).
257. Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
258. Id.
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Admirable as this vision may be, experience teaches that un-
workable standards and broad interpretations can lead to bad
judgments as well as good ones. This is graphically illustrated by
the doctrines, analyses, conclusions, and final result in two non-
treatment cases involving practically the same facts.
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 259 for
example, determined the fate of a profoundly retarded, institution-
alized man with leukemia. Due to the severity of retardation, 260
Saikewicz could not understand the nature of chemotherapy, in-
cluding its painful side-effects. Despite the fact that most leuke-
mia victims choose to withstand the side-effects and undergo
chemotherapy, the court allowed treatment to be withheld under a
substituted judgment analysis. Although the court found his pri-
vacy interest in refusing treatment2 61 greater in this instance than
the state's interest in preserving life, it attempted to personalize
the manner in which it arrived at that decision.2 62 The court ex-
pressly refused to take the prospective quality of life into consider-
ation even though Saikewicz's life expectancy was little more than
a year,26 3 and focused instead on "the incompetent person's actual
interests and preferences." 264
Of course, Saikewicz's actual desires simply could not be deter-
mined, but the court maintained that the standard for substituted
judgment should primarily be a subjective one.265 The person
charged with the responsibility of consent may be forced "to rely
to a greater degree on objective criteria, such as the supposed in-
ability of profoundly retarded persons to conceptualize or fear
death."266 Nevertheless, the court emphasized that "the effort to
bring substituted judgment into step with the values and desires of
the affected individual must not, and need not, be abandoned."2 67
259. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
260. The man had a mental age of two years, eight months. Id& at 731, 370 N.E.2d at
420.
261. Apparently, the court was following Quinlan. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 44,
355 A.2d 647, 663-64 (1976).
262. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759,
370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977).
263. Cf. In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 41 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
264. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759,
370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977).
265. This standard may be better than quality of life or child's best interests as-
sessments, since it attempts to be as subjective as possible from the stand-
point of the person for whom treatment is considered.
266. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759,
370 N.E.2d 417, 430 (1977).
267. Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969)
(a kidney transplant from an incompetent to his brother would be in the in-
competent's best interests, since he was psychologically dependent on his
otherwise doomed brother).
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While it may be impossible to confer any sense of value or desire
on a newborn baby, Saikewicz may at least indicate attempts to
adhere to as subjective a standard as possible and to avoid the
outside considerations of family and finance that hamper defective
newborn treatment decisions.2 68
In re Storar269 involved much the same factual situation as
Saikewicz, but eventually arrived at a different result.270 Storar
addressed the question of treatment of a profoundly retarded, in-
stitutionalized, older man whose mother wished to discontinue the
necessary blood transfusions her son received as treatment for ter-
minal cancer. The man's life expectancy was only a few months,
he was losing a great deal of blood, and he required a sedative to
receive the often painful and intrusive treatment, the purpose of
which he could not comprehend.27 ' The lower court, following a
right of privacy argument,272 approved withdrawing treatment, and
Storar died of the cancer sometime thereafter. The appeals court
reviewed the propriety of the decision, and reversed, clearly re-
jecting the substituted judgment doctrine as a workable standard
in such cases. 27 3
The Storar situation may be further contrasted with that in
Eichner v. Dillon.274 Eichner involved an elderly, comatose cancer
victim near death who had (in the past and while competent)
clearly expressed a desire not to have his life prolonged, should he
be unable to make his own treatment decisions. 275 There was no
proof that Storar had expressed such a desire. Storar had been
mentally incompetent all of his life,276 and thus completely incapa-
ble of making a reasoned judgment about medical treatment.
[I]t is unrealistic to attempt to determine whether he would want to con-
tinue potentially life-prolonging treatment if he were competent....
[T] hat would be similar to asking whether 'if it snowed all summer would
268. The court may not have needed the substituted judgment doctrine to decide
Saikewicz. Since the patient had a terminal illness and only a short time to
live, the analysis might just as easily been one of balancing risk of harm
against substantial benefit. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
269. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
270. One may question whether the Saikeuicz result (upholding nontreatment),
so deliberately a substituted judgment conclusion, was preferable to the
Storar decision (reversing nontreatment decision), which expressly rejected
substituted judgment.
271. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 375,420 N.E.2d 64, 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 271-72 (1981).
272. In re Storar, 106 Misc. 2d 880, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
273. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 381-82,420 N.E.2d 64, 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 275 (1981).
274. 73 A.D.2d 431, 467, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 544 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
275. Id. See also Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. App. 1978), approved,
379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (dealing with the right of a competent adult to refuse
treatment).
276. In fact, he had been institutionalized since age five. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 373, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270 (1981).
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it then be winter?' Mentally John Storar was an infant and that is the only
realistic way to assess his rights .... 277
The Storar case suggests some clear parallels to Baby Doe:
[T]he transfusions were analogous to food-they would not cure the can-
cer, but they could eliminate the risk of death from another treatable
cause. Of course, John Storar did not like them, as might be expected of
one with an infant's mentality. But ... the transfusions did not involve
excessive pain and . . . without them his mental and physical abilities
would not be maintained at the usual level. With the transfusions, .. . he
was essentially the same as before .... A court should not in the circum-
stances of this case allow an incompetent patient to bleed to death be-
cause someone, even ... a parent, .. feels that this is best for one with
an incurable disease.
2 78
The Storar court relied on the "ordinariness" of blood transfu-
sion treatment,2 79 as contrasted with any extraordinary care of an
heroic nature.28 0 Clearly, a "Baby Doe" incompetent should not be
allowed to starve to death for want of ordinary surgical treat-
ment-treatment that certainly would have been provided to a
non-retarded baby. It is simply immaterial that doctors could not
predict the severity of Baby Doe's mental retardation. John Storar
was profoundly retarded, and suffered the further complication of
277. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
278. Id. at 381-82, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76.
279. Id. at 381, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
280. There has been an attempt to "classify" nontreatment situations, according
to the degree of medical treatment and attention the child requires. "Ordi-
nary" care, it is argued, should be employed to save the defective newborn.
But when the means necessary to sustain life become "extraordinary", that
is, they involve substantial risk to the patient, or grave burdens to another,
they are no longer required. As with many nontreatment labels, the "ex-
traordinary" rubric is relative with respect to the benefit conveyed to the
child, the severity of the disability, the quality of life prognosis, and finally,
perhaps, with respect to the competing interests involved. See Longino,
supra note 2, at 398. One author asserts that "[f] ew persons would argue that
'extraordinary' care must be provided a defective newborn, or indeed, to any
person. The difficult question, however, is to distinguish 'ordinary' from 'ex-
traordinary' care." Robertson, supra note 6, at 213 n.1. Certainly, the Catholic
Church has taken the position that extraordinary care is never required. See
Paris, Terminating Treatment for Newborns: A Theological Perspective, in
LAW, MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 120 (1982).
Another classification system attempts to determine which treatments are
medically feasible and which are not, and thus, the focus is largely one of
medical evaluation: "A treatment is 'infeasible' if it cannot benefit the in-
fant-that is, if the treatment inevitably will prove futile once administered
or will cause the infant's condition to deteriorate." Note, supra note 63 at 623.
This standard may avoid certain elements such as quality of life, child's best
interests, and substituted judgment-all of which are arguably too open to
interpretation-in favor of a more rigid standard which allows much less dis-
cretion. It is suggested that a child's treatment is medically infeasible if
death even with "the most advanced treatment" will occur within the first
year of life, or if the cognitive brain function is absent. Id. at 624.
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a painful terminal disease. Yet the court would not approve with-
holding him lifesaving treatment.2 81
Court involvement, as it is now, suggests not only problems in
practice, but problems in practicality. Heavy reliance on judicial
determinations may flood the courts with unnecessary litigation.282
Even without this, the court system may simply be too cumber-
some and slow-moving to handle nontreatment questions with effi-
cacy.283 Such practicalities aside, the fictions employed by the
courts-those of substituted judgment, quality of life, and child's
best interests-may ultimately be viewed as judicial nonsense:
The root of the problem lies in an underlying Orwellian assumption that a
court using substituted judgment is positioned-like Big Brother-to
know what is best for the dying patient. In my view such is practical, legal
and moral nonsense. It is practical nonsense because Judges have no ex-
traordinary insight enabling them to measure the "quality of life ...... It
is legal nonsense because in our "rights-oriented" modern jurisprudence,
all rights begin with the human, qua human. To deprive a human of life,
no matter how burdened it may be, is to deny that person of any and all
rights. Such ultimate deprivation of rights makes a mockery of the lesser
rights so zealously safeguarded. It is moral nonsense because to judicially
order treatment terminated is antithetical to the moral precepts which un-
derlie the common law. Courts should refrain from the temptation to be
judicially active in this type of case involving such momentous moral
issues.2 8
4
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps courts will never completely escape the pressure to ad-
judicate morality. For the nontreatment issue, they are ill-
equipped to do so, since until quite recently the guidelines were
thin and elastic. Further, the tools with which the court fashions a
moral answer are logical ones. Precedents become premises, and
logical derivations from judicial precedents do not always lead to
moral conclusions. The right to privacy is a fundamental, morally
based, constitutional derivative-and a good one. But when Baby
Doe's life became subservient to his parents' right to privacy, that
notion reached the limits of its logic, and went beyond the limits of
its morality.
With the advent of ambitious federal regulation, the public's
281. The notable absence of any medically recommended choice to withdraw the
transfusion treatment may have affected the Storar decision.
282. Brant, Last Rights: An Analysis of Refusal and Withholding of Treatment
Cases, 46 Mo. L. REv. 337, 352 (1981).
283. It has been asserted that "when physicians want an answer, they want it in 10
minutes. When lawyers produce an answer, they congratulate themselves for
producing it in 10 days." PRESIDENT'S COaM'N REP., supra note 4, at 225 n.94
(quoting testimony).
284. In re Storar, 78 A.D.2d 1013, 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (1980) (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting).
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duty to complete the nontreatment inquiry has become compel-
ling. Whether we choose to leave the parents to their privacy, or
speak as one social child advocate, we must undertake the respon-
sibility with understanding, and be clear about it. Should we de-
cide to support private decisionmaking, we cannot later let it
matter that one baby dies while his brothers are saved. Condemn-
ing that individual judgment is cruel hypocrisy once we have
washed our hands of the larger issue.
Public concern and national debate suggest more thorough leg-
islation is in order. Without stronger state law to protect weak life
and to support suffering parents our society risks a little ethical
self-destruction. For not only will our inaction affect the lives of
handicapped citizens, it may impact upon healthy society, as well.
We may spawn a newer, less tolerant, less willing society, neither
tempered with the realness of pain nor brought up with the same
capacity for compassion.285 Despite all the medical advances,
then, we may never fully realize our power to conquer sickness
and disability if we simply refuse to tolerate it.
Anne Elizabeth Winner '85
285. And perhaps that is where a pure love motivation theory runs dry. See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 47 at 734-35.
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